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This thesis explains why the Philippine Congress, despite the 1987 Constitution‘s 
mandate to enact it, passed the Overseas Absentee Voting (OAV) law in 2003, not earlier. I 
argue that the existing literature, which views Philippine politics as being dominated by 
competing patrons or the political elite, plays down the role of civil society actors and 
therefore provides only a partial explanation of the OAV issue. I offer an alternative 
explanation that highlights the contentious interactions between state and society.  
Specifically, I examine how state and society actors influenced the internal and external 
factors of the OAV law‘s legislative process. Chapter 3 demonstrates how external factors – 
the presidential support in mid-term legislative elections, the emergence of a sectoral party 
Akbayan in the House of Representatives since 1998, the Asian economic crisis, and the 
advent of the Internet in the late 1990s – provided vital political opportunities for the law‘s 
passage in 2003. These external elements combined to produce a favourable environment in 
the early 2000s, in which OAV advocates intensified their lobby campaigns and politicians 
changed their hitherto uncompromising stand against the introduction of absentee voting. 
Chapter 4 deals with the factors internal to overseas Filipinos as OAV advocates. By 
examining the International Coalition for Overseas Filipinos‘ Voting Rights (ICOFVR), it 
shows how the advocates adapted their lobbying strategies to given opportunities and how the 
strategies helped change the attitudes of opposing politicians. I also address another internal 
element of the successful lobbying, i.e., the increasing grievances of overseas Filipinos 
towards the Philippine government. Chapter 5 traces a growing chasm between the high 
expectations of overseas Filipinos and their grim reality of their treatment by the government 
through the 1990s. I find that these grievances of overseas Filipinos encouraged them to 
participate in the OAV lobby campaigns in the early 2000s.  
  
   Chapter 6 concludes that the passage of the OAV law in 2003 was a product of the 
dynamic interaction between external and internal factors. Its enactment was neither a sole 
decision of the political elite such as the president and legislators, nor a consequence purely 
of overseas Filipinos‘ avid lobby campaigns for their voting rights. This conclusion proves 
that a comprehensive approach including society as well as state actors better explains the 
changed landscape of Philippine politics than the extant literature. Although it certainly has 
its own share of problems, overseas Filipino activism has become a significant contributing 
factor in Philippine national politics and as such deserves increased academic attention.  
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Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
After the 1986 People Power Revolution expelled the long-time dictator Ferdinand 
Marcos out of the Philippines, debates on the direction of post-Marcos Philippine     
democracy came to the fore. Contrary to popular expectations, the democratic transition in 
the Philippines was not rosy. Infighting occurred between different factions of the 
―revolutionaries‖, such as the military, the Catholic Church, and the opposition groups, over 
who was to be credited for the democratization, and this led to the shaky ruling coalition of 
the Cory Aquino government. What complicated the diverse coalition was the revival of the 
oligarchic elite in the 1987 legislative elections and the 1988 local elections (Anderson 1988, 
Gutierrez et al 1992, Sidel 1999, Simbulan 2007).
1
 With these forces continuously vying for 
political supremacy, Aquino and her successors failed to institutionalise direct participation of 
civil society in Philippine politics. Backed by the rhetoric of the People Power, the 
democratic governments initiated political reforms, only to find themselves surrounded by a 
barrage of staunch objections in Congress. The bicameral Congress of the Philippines 
effectively impeded the legislation of the reform measures or mangled it beyond recognition 
(Hutchcroft and Rocamora 2003: 278). As disgruntled Filipinos rose again against the 
incapacity of politicians in the second and third People Powers in 2001, the country saw a 
vicious cycle of dysfunctional democracy. In this dynamic political landscape, Philippine 
democracy was walking a fine line between pent-up demands from below and the conflicting 
interests of the elite.   
 
Puzzle 
                                                          
1
 Benedict Anderson (1988: 30) notes that, since the United States imposed American electoralism on the 
Philippine archipelago in the early 20th century, the oligarchs have dominated the Philippines‘ elective office 




This research attempts to trace the difficult process of making Philippine democracy 
work in the post-Marcos era. I will do so by examining one of the few successful political 
reforms of the re-democratisation process: the passage of ―the Overseas Absentee Voting act 
of 2003‖ (hereafter the OAV law) which allowed over ten million overseas Filipinos to cast 
their ballots in the Philippine national elections. The OAV legislation is an intriguing puzzle, 
given the fact that a group of traditional politicians, who had blocked it and other political 
reform bills since 1987, finally relented and agreed to its passing in 2003. In the intervening 
16 years between the OAV law‘s proposal and its final enactment, a diasporic community of 
Filipinos abroad, the so-called Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs), vociferously advocated its 
passage and intensely lobbied national politicians for their voting rights
2
. The question is, 
why did it take such a long time for the passage of the OAV law in Congress? In other words, 
why was the OAV law passed in 2003, not earlier?  
Seeking to answer this question, I will address the following issues: (1) the 
composition of the OAV advocates; (2) the motives and strategies of the OAV advocates; (3) 
the change of politicians‘ attitudes towards the OAV law; and (4) external factors affecting 
the behaviors of the politicians and the OAV advocates. Let me start by briefly introducing 
here several related actors and events of the OAV issue in the context of the politics of 
Philippine migration.  
 
The OAV issue in Philippine political history 
 
Filipinos have a long history of working abroad. Since 1565, when Spanish colonisers 
                                                          
2
 Hereafter I will use the abbreviated term OFWs when referring to overseas Filipino workers. The term has 
been popular in the Philippines since the government and media used it in the mid-1990s. Although other 
abbreviated terms, such as OCWs (Overseas Contract Workers) and OFIs (Overseas Filipino Investors), have 
been interchangeably used, this thesis uses the OFWs to avoid confusion.   
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forced Filipinos to work as seamen on trade ships heading toward Mexico and the ―New 
World,‖ the first generation of Filipino migrant workers came into being. In the early 20th 
century, Filipinos found it easier to work in the U.S.A due to the Philippines‘ special status as 
an American colony (Gonzalez 1998: 26-30). To benefit from the flow of Filipino migrant 
workers, the US colonial government enacted the Commonwealth government‘s law in 1915, 
which became the archetype of successive migrant labour laws in the independent Republic 
of the Philippines.  
As early as the 1970s, the authoritarian Marcos government launched a labour 
migration programme to alleviate the political and economic problems of the country (e.g., 
the drastic increase in oil prices and political instability caused by martial law in 1972) by 
sending Filipinos abroad. Although the Marcos government considered labour migration as a 
short term solution to stabilise its economic downturn and political situations, several factors 
encouraged the government to continue promoting the programme. In tandem with the 
increasing number of OFWs in the 1970s, their remittances from abroad helped alleviate the 
country‘s chronic debts and trade deficits. On the political front, the labour export policy 
helped the authoritarian government‘s claim to legitimacy by presenting itself as a job 
provider to the unemployed and the underemployed (Vasquez 1992: 42; Tyner 2004: 32-33). 
Thus the government continued to promote economic migration beyond its initial intent to 
see it as temporary. With the number of OFWs increasing, however, the Philippines faced a 
new challenge from spiralling welfare complaints of overseas workers. According to a 
government agency that processes OFWs, the Philippine Overseas Employment 
Administration (POEA), the complaints over OFW welfare (e.g., illegal recruitment, abuses 
in destination countries, the incidence of contract substitution, and the violation of POEA 
regulation and other related laws) skyrocketed almost sevenfold from 1982 to 1987 (See 
Table 1). Although the Marcos government set aside several seats for OFW sectoral 
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representatives in the Interim Batasang Pambansa (Interim National Assembly), the measure 
had little real effect in bringing OFW grievances to the attention of the government.  
 
Table 1. Number of OFW complaints handled and resolved by POEA  
 Cases handled Cases resolved 
1982 2,235 - 
1984 1,856 1065 
1985 5,742 3959 
1986 8,427 4979 
1987 13,404 11425 
Source: POEA Annual Report 1982-1987 
 
The downfall of Marcos followed by the inauguration of Cory Aquino in 1986 raised 
optimism among OFWs that change could be in the offing. The Aquino government‘s first 
and foremost change was to restore democracy by introducing a new democratic constitution. 
Backed by it progressive commissioners, the Philippine Constitutional Commission of 1986 
drafted the 1987 Constitution that included several political reform clauses. Among the 
reform provisions was the introduction of the overseas absentee voting system for ‗qualified 
Filipinos abroad‘ (Article V, Section 2). However, the provision did not specify the 
implementation of the OAV law, leaving it to Congress to make enabling laws. The 
requirement was prescient of the 16-year delay in legislation.  
While keeping in pace with the old regime on labour migration policy, the Aquino 
government seemed to be indifferent to the OAV legislation. Concerned with other pressing 
matters such as agrarian reform and decentralization, the government did not prioritize the 
implementation of the OAV
3
. The behaviour of the legislators appeared little different; some 
legislators filed three different OAV bills in the 8th Congress (1987-1992), but it turned out 
                                                          
3
 A review of the two major Manila dailies (Philippine Daily Inquirer and The Manila Chronicle) during the 
Aquino years reveals the OAV issue, let alone electoral reform, does not rank in the 26 most frequently-
publicized policy issues at that time (Magadia 2003: 36). 
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that all of the bills ended up being shelved due to a lack of vigour among legislators
4
. 
After winning the presidential election in 1992, the government of President Fidel 
Ramos made a strong push for political reform.
5
 Although it did prioritise the OAV 
legislation, the Ramos administration (1992-1998) failed to sign any OAV bills into law. 
Instead, in the wake of the hanging of a Filipina domestic helper Flor Contemplacion in 
Singapore and the public anger that followed in the Philippines, the 9th Congress passed a 
landmark law for the welfare of the OFWs, the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act 
of 1995.
6
 The Contemplacion issue was a cornerstone for the labour migration policy in the 
Philippines and at the same time, it helped the OAV advocates to mobilize OFWs by using 
the groundswell of anger as a catalyst.  
Under the Joseph Estrada government (1998-2001), the OAV issue received a big boost. 
As the Asian financial crisis swirled around the Philippines in the late 1990s, the government 
needed more remittances from the OFWs than before to sustain the ailing economy. Estrada 
coddled the OFWs by praising them as saviours of the country. At the same time, the OAV 
advocates became a more unified force, partly because of popular use of the Internet at the 
end of the 20th century. Lobbies for the OAV law were intense and finally, in 2001, a House 
version of the OAV bill (House Bill 10720) was about to pass through a third reading. 
However, the impeachment trial of President Estrada following charges of plunder and 
corruption in January 2001 thwarted all progress made by the OAV advocates‘ lobbying 
                                                          
4
 The three bills are House Bill (HB) 4058, 6507 and Senate Bill (SB) 78. 
5
 Kent Eaton (2003: 477) presents two reasons why Ramos showed more reform-oriented stance than his 
predecessor Aquino. First, Aquino was a member of the traditional political family in the Philippines, whereas 
Ramos was a technocrat in the military before shifting into politics. Second, Ramos did not receive much 
support from traditional political clans in the 1992 presidential election, thus he was relatively free to initiate 
reform. 
6
 The Singapore Court charged Contemplacion for killing a Singaporean boy and another Filipina domestic 
helper. After her conviction, the wrangle over the real culprit caused a wave of protests in the Philippines. In the 
wake of this accident, the Philippine government‘s inability to protect its citizens abroad came under a constant 
drumfire of criticism from the media such that a director of an OFW organisation indicates that he receive 
reports and complaints from OFWs every year, but the government always showed inability to deal with the 
cases (PDI Mar 19, 1995, 10). 
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efforts. The Philippine Congress shelved the OAV bill once again. 
The OAV advocates continued to lobby for the OAV law under the Glorial Macapagal-
Arroyo government. Arroyo showed her support by adopting the OAV bill as a priority bill. In 
2001, a group of OAV advocates formed their first international organization, the 
International Coalition for Overseas Filipinos‘ Voting Rights (ICOFVR) to make a concerted 
effort to pass the OAV bill. The lobby campaigns of the ICOFVR were more intense than 
those of OAV advocates in the 1990s. Whereas the latter had banked on OFWs‘ furor over 
their abuse cases and mistreatment of the Philippine government, the former began as OFWs 
gained their increasing economic leverage in the Philippine economy in the late 1990s and 
therefore realised the incongruity between the Philippine government‘s ill treatments and 
their desire to be treated as economic heroes or National Heroes.
7
    
Thanks to the intense lobbying campaigns by the ICOFVR, bipartisan support in 
Congress and other external opportunities, the Philippine Congress finally passed the OAV 
bill and President Arroyo signed the long-awaited OAV bill into law on 13 February 2003. 
The OAV law was a big achievement for the political empowerment of OFWs who paid their 
taxes as Philippine citizens but had been deprived of their voting rights for over 20 years. The 
law stipulates that all qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad may vote for president, 
vice-president, senators and party-list representatives
8
. By granting them one of the basic 
rights, the OAV law recognizes OFWs as full-fledging citizens.    
 
Scope of the study 
 
This study covers the 16-year legislative process that led to enactment of the OAV law. 
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 See Chapter 4 for detail. 
8
 By qualified citizens it indicates all Filipino citizens ―not otherwise disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) 
years of age on the day of the election, and who are registered overseas absentee voters with approved 
application to vote in absentia‖ (Commission on Elections 2003).  
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Since the OAV provision found its way to the 1987 Constitution, the Philippine government 
and Congress had received constant lobbying from OAV advocates until the passage of the 
law in 2003. It is interesting to note that the OAV lobby tended to be most intense when 
legislative and presidential elections were near in the Philippines. This is explained by the 
OAV advocates‘ desire to participate in upcoming national elections. During the period 
between 1987 and 2003, the Philippines had four legislative elections: 1992, 1995, 1998 and 
2001
9
. Thus the focus of this study revolves around each election year during the 16 year 
period. 
To understand the question of ‗why 2003, not earlier?‘, this study focuses on the 
lobbying in the twelfth Congress (2001-2004) since the concerted lobbying efforts of the 
OAV advocates did not appear until 2001. An examination of the OAV advocates‘ 
international network, the ICOFVR, is a key part of this study. The ICOFVR, launched in 
2001, consists of more than 400 overseas Filipino organizations from all over the world. To 
ensure cooperation and coherent activities among its member organizations, several leading 
groups in the ICOFVR, such as the Center for Migrant Advocacy (CMA) and the Akbayan 
political party, played a critical role in achieving the successful passage of the OAV law. For 
investigating the lobbying activities of the ICOFVR, this research focuses on how the key 
leading groups devised lobbying strategies and how other member groups employed the 
strategies, thereby influencing politicians in the Philippines.  
 
Significance of the study 
 
This research will contribute to the literature on Philippine politics and state-society 
relations by highlighting three crucial issues: (1) the use of contentious politics literature in 
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the analysis of the policy-making process; (2) the changing state-civil society relationship in 
the Philippines; and (3) the political role of OFWs in the Philippines. 
First of all, this study draws on the contentious politics literature for analysing the case 
of OAV legislation.
10
 This is necessary because the process took place in the context of 
Philippine political situation where democratic institutions were dominated by the oligarchic 
elite with little regard for the interest of the poor majority of the population.
11
 In a country 
where political parties cannot fulfill the function of linkage between state and society, 
disgruntled society actors must employ unconventional strategies to make their voices heard. 
Beginning with a barrage of individual contacts with legislators, a myriad of OFWs made 
various efforts such as postings of advertisements in daily newspapers, signature campaigns 
and demonstrations. To analyse the effects of these unconventional strategies of the OAV 
advocates on the passage of the OAV law, there needs to be a contentious politics framework. 
Existing policy analysis tools deal only with conventional ways of interaction between 
politicians and lobbyists. Because a contentious politics framework assumes that claimants 
undertake a significant role in achieving their goals, it can better measure the effects of the 
OAV lobbying campaigns. 
Second, the fact that the OAV advocacy groups in question are not merely located in 
the Philippines implicates another significance of this study: long-distance civil activism. 
With the help of advances in communication technologies such as mobile phones and the 
Internet, an international coalition of OAV advocacy groups, the ICOFVR, had its 
membership base from all over the world. As will be explained in the following chapters, 
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 Contentious politics refers to public and collective interaction happened in non-institutional ways between 
government and non-governmental groups. Chapter 2 will offer details of the contentious politics literature. 
11
 Philippine scholars have noted that political parties in the Philippines are indistinguishable from one another 
in their platforms and compositions, and most parties are unstable due to the high occurrences of their members‘ 
party-switching for maximizing the chances of winning elections (Abinales and Amoroso 2005: 239; Lande 
1996: 120-121). Therefore the weak political party system has ―failed to structure political competition to allow 
for the representation of the interests of the poor and marginalized sectors‖ (Montinola 1999: 133). 
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most of the ICOFVR member groups also avidly participated in many lobbying activities. 
The different locations of the OAV advocates can also address a chronic problem of 
Philippine civil society: a lack of resources. For example, Chapter 4 notes that the OAV 
advocates, most of whom were OFWs, voluntarily supplied money for an OAV advocates‘ 
delegation visit to the Philippines and other lobbying activities. Given that many civil society 
activities in the third world have suffered from a lack of money and other resources, this 
study can document a changing situation of civil society activism in the developing world.  
Lastly, the emergence of OFWs as a political force in Philippine politics deserves an 
examination. As of 2007, the number of overseas Filipinos was 8.7 million, approximately 
ten percent of the entire Philippine population (CFO 2007). This considerable number of 
OFWs combined with their relatively wealthier economic position over the poor majority of 
the Philippine population makes them an influential political actor. Despite the increase in the 
OFW population and their influence in their homeland, research on the politics of Philippine 
migration has been largely lacking. Hence this research can provide a pioneering case study 
on the role of OFWs in Philippine politics.       
 
Research methodology  
 
This study is based on several sources of data. I conducted an extensive search on 
English newspapers and magazine articles, internet resources, and government publications to 
map the trajectory of OAV lobbying. Internet resources, such as online newspaper articles and 
cyber forums regarding the OAV issue, offered critical information on the OAV lobbying 
activities since, given the hefty cost of overseas phone calls and fax machines, only internet 
communication can link dispersed OAV advocates and keep them united at a reasonable cost. 
To that end, OAV advocates set up several online websites for mobilizing and informing 
10 
 
people regarding the OAV issue. As of January 2008, there still exist several websites – 
―materials on Overseas Voting‖12, ―Campaign central‖13 and online petition websites14 – 
which served as a public arena to disseminate and share information among members and 
other internet users. From these sites, I gained many documents such as the list of financial 
donors for the OAV delegation visit to the Philippines in 2001 and a model letter used for 
letter-writing campaigns. These plentiful internet resources provided detailed and vivid 
voices of the OAV advocates.  
For newspaper research, I mainly drew on the Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI), the 
most widely circulated English national newspaper in the Philippines, and partly on other 
local and international newspapers. By using Factiva or equivalent electronic searching tools, 
I searched through articles published during the period between 1986 and 2003, and coded 
related events according to their type of action, time and space. The collected articles from 
newspapers include the news and interviews on the OAV issue. I also found various opinions 
of the OFWs regarding the OAV issue in op-ed pages of the newspapers.   
Many libraries helped me find magazines and books related to the issue. During my 
research in 2008, I visited the libraries of the National University of Singapore; University of 
Hong Kong; University of the Philippines, Diliman; and Ateneo De Manila University in the 
Philippines. While OFW magazines published in Singapore and Hong Kong offered me a 
glimpse into how OFWs perceived their homeland, other locally published periodicals and 
publications I encountered in the Philippines provided a clear picture of the OAV issue and 
Philippine politics.  
Government institutions in the Philippines were also rich in government publications. 
In May 2008, I visited the Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO) and the Philippine 






Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) in the Philippines. A number of periodicals 
published by the two institutions enabled me to collect a wide range of statistical data on 
Philippine migration. Another significant source of information was archives in the Senate 
and the House of the Representatives in the Philippines. Collecting transcripts of floor 
discussions and committee hearings/meetings on the OAV bill was an important part of my 
research. The written records of the legislators‘ statements were a useful indicator of their 
perceptions of the OAV issue.  
Along with document materials, I also interviewed relevant actors of the OAV issue: an 
activist from a Manila-based member organization of the ICOFVR, several leaders in the 
Hong Kong chapter of the ICOFVR, a national politician of the Philippines, a Manila-based 
journalist, and a leader of the Saudi Arabia chapter of the ICOFVR. Due to time and distance 
constraints, I conducted e-mail interviews with some ICOFVR members in the US and 
Europe. For these interviews, I prepared a questionnaire that covered such topics as the 
respondent‘s motivations in participating in OAV lobbying, the strategies of the ICOFVR, 
and the relationship between the respondent‘s party and national politicians. While the 
questionnaires were largely the same, I tailored the questionnaire for each respondent. An 
example of the questionnaire is attached in Appendix 2.   
          
Overview of the chapters  
 
The thesis consists of six chapters including this introductory chapter. Chapter 2 lays 
the theoretical groundwork. It is a literature review of the studies of Philippine politics and 
proposes an analytical framework for this research. After reviewing dominant explanations of 
Philippine politics, I argue that Philippine scholars should view Philippine politics as a 
dynamic entity equally contested by the state and social forces from below. I present a 
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changing outlook of Philippine politics, particularly in the area of the state-society 
relationship. The latter half of Chapter 2 draws on the contentious politics literature to present 
a suitable framework for understanding the OAV movement.  
Subsequent chapters address the central question of this study: the 16-year delay of 
the OAV law. Chapters from 3 to 5 present empirical materials on the OAV issue. Chapter 3 
takes a closer look at the politico-economic situations of the Philippines during the 16 years. 
It looks especially at the changing structure of the Philippine elite and at the Asian financial 
crisis to explain the increasing influence of overseas Filipinos and the passage of the OAV act 
in 2003. Chapter 3 also reveals that President Arroyo had a personal motivation to push for 
the OAV issue, given the positive effect that the incorporation of expatriate Filipino voters 
would have on her chances of re-election in the 2004 presidential election. Chapter 4 looks 
into the mobilizing structure of the ICOFVR and its lobbying strategies. It argues that a range 
of the OAV lobbying activities helped shift politicians‘ hitherto inimical attitude towards the 
OAV legislation. Chapter 5 delves into the grievances of the OAV advocates. By analysing 
the Philippine government‘s dual attitude towards OFWs and the resulting frustration of the 
OFWs, I suggest that the OFWs displayed their increasing deprivation in the late 1990s and 
that it finally led to their unwavering support for the OAV legislation in the early 2000s.  
As a conclusion, Chapter 6 summarises the new findings discovered in this study. It 
notes that the passage of the OAV law in 2003 resulted from a variety of external and internal 
factors. While intense lobbying campaigns by the ICOFVR played an important role in 
persuading politicians and President Arroyo‘s desire to maximize her re-election chances 
influenced administrative legislators in the 12th Congress, the opening of political 
opportunities at that time for individuals (e.g., the development of the Internet) was also 
critical. The OAV advocates were well aware of the political opportunities given to them and 
made effective use of these opportunities. Chapter 6 also ventures into some policy 
13 
 
recommendations for the Philippine civil society actors interested in the national policy-


























Chapter 2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to contextualise the OAV case in the literature of 
Philippine politics. To that end, I first briefly discuss two dominant perspectives on 
Philippine politics: the patron-client framework and the elite democracy model. I then present 
some findings of this study that do not fit the prevalent explanations. The next part of this 
chapter searches for an alternative framework. I show that a contentious politics framework 
can better explain the OAV case than the existing frameworks and examine three main 
elements of the contentious politics framework: political opportunity structure, mobilising 
structure and framing processes. 
 
Contesting perspectives on Philippine politics 
 
The most prominent approach to Philippine politics is the patron-client framework. 
This views Philippine politics as a system operated by interpersonal alliances based on family 
and faction members. Carl Lande (1965: 1-2), the most famous proponent of this approach, 
defines the patron-client relationship as vertical and horizontal ―dyadic ties‖ between elites 
―who can afford to be patrons‖ and their clients who can vote for patrons in exchange for 
―material or other rewards‖. In an analysis of the post-independence politics of the 
Philippines, Lande articulates that two major political parties, the Nacionalista and the 
Liberals, are indeed identical in their policies, members and ideological positions. Lande 
points to ―vertical chains of dyadic patron-client relationships‖ in both parties. Unlike in 
Western democracies, the two parties are based on patrons and clients who come from ―all 
social strata, all occupational groups, and all regions‖, not interest groups or distinctive social 
classes (Lande 1965: 2). His approach has been the most influential in explaining Philippine 
15 
 
electoral politics and many Philippine scholars adopted his perspective to explain other 
political incidents such as the emergence of political machines in the 1970s (Quimpo 2008: 
26).  
The patron-client model has enjoyed great influence in Philippine studies, however, the 
OAV case does not fit the model. OAV advocates seemed to have been less restrained by the 
power of patrons. Most of those advocating OAV reform were long-time overseas residents, 
thus they were not in need of any reward in exchange for supporting patrons. For instance, in 
an interview with an OAV advocate, Cynthia Ca Abdon-Tellez, I asked whether OAV 
advocates in Hong Kong depended on patron-client relations when pressing national 
politicians for the OAV legislation.
15
 She responded, 
We don‘t do it. This (lobby) is different. … If you don‘t know who the person is, 
then you don‘t get any favour.  
 
As she noted, OFWs are less likely to get favour from politicians. Pork barrel policies usually 
benefit local clients, not OFWs.
16
  
Moreover, even if politicians in the Philippines want to bribe OFWs, bribing is less 
likely to work for them because they are not in desperate need of money.
17
 As will be 
described in Chapter 4, some OAV advocates were rich enough to afford their airfares and 
accommodation when paying a delegation visit to the Philippines in August 2001.  
National politicians in the Philippines also seem to realise that, once the OAV law is 
implemented, they can no longer enjoy influence as patrons because campaigning abroad is 
difficult even for rich politicians. Indeed, when Congress discussed an OAV bill in 2003, 
Senator Barbers expressed his reservations that politicians with limited resources such as 
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 Nograles and Lagman (2008: 5) explain that the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF), considered one of 
pork barrel funds, was created ―for projects in all congressional districts and the national constituency of 
Senators‖.  
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 OFWs tend to have a high level of formal education and they do not come from the most impoverished 
backgrounds (Pinches 2001: 195; Constable 1997: 185).  
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himself cannot win an absentee voting election against rich candidates (Senate 2003: 273). 
Senator Pimentel also said neither bribing nor vote-buying would work, because ―they are 
there abroad‖ (Senate 2002a: 81).    
The empirical misfit above can be summarised as a criticism that the patron-client 
relation is just one of many aspects in Philippine politics. This line of criticism is not new. 
Many Philippine scholars repeatedly criticized the patron-client model for its simplistic, 
reductive accounts of Philippine politics. Reynaldo Ileto, a leading historian of the 
Philippines, argues that students of the patron-client framework not only ―reduce the complex 
relationships‖ into ―a contest of despotisms‖, but also single out patron-client ties as the most 
essential factor in Philippine politics (Ileto 2001: 10-11). In a similar vein, Kerkvliet (1995: 
404) argues that ―the framework leaves little or no room for other values and ideas, other 
bases for cleavage and struggle, other grounds for organizing and cooperating‖. As an 
example of the ―other values and ideas‖, Kerkvliet (1995: 411) draws on the efforts of actors 
in Philippine civil society to make elections clean and fair, such as the making of the National 
Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) in 1951 and the high tide of enthusiasm shown 
among Filipinos in the first post-Marcos election in 1986. Kerkvliet‘s examples are similar to 
the OAV advocates‘ struggle against the state to win their voting rights.  
Another explanation of Philippine politics, the elite democracy framework, gained 
ascendency among Philippine scholars as an alternative to the patron-client framework.
18
 
Viewing post-Marcos politics as the ‗return of oligarchic elites‘ (Gutierrez et al 1992), the 
elite democracy approach demonstrates how the national oligarchy have restored its 
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 Scholars supporting the elite democracy framework note that the patron-client approach cannot explain two 
phenomena in Philippine politics. First, it cannot account for persistent practices of election violence. Since the 
patron-client model is based on reciprocal exchange of mutually valued goods and services, scholars working 
within the patron-client model find that ―violence and fraud are unusual and rarely affect outcomes‖ (Kerkvliet 
1995: 406). Second, as political machines in the 1990s depend more on material inducements than traditional 
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clientelist relations expounded in the patron-client model (Quimpo 2008: 25-26).     
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entrenched position in elective office after Marcos fled the country.
19
 It assumes that 
political elites in the oligarchy use connections, wealth and violence to control the country‘s 
resources (Kerkvliet 1995: 405). By focusing on elite competition in election periods, the 
elite democracy framework effectively sheds light on issues hitherto ignored by the patron-
client framework such as election violence and fraud in Philippine politics. A central theme 
running through the different subtypes of elite democracy approaches is that the oligarchic 
elites, who are drawn from land, commerce and industry, realise their interests by plundering 
underdeveloped state apparatus.  
Here again, the OAV case does not fit with the model. Whereas the elite model 
downplays the role of civil society actors in explaining Philippine politics, this study deals 
with the emergence of Philippine civil society actors as a powerful political force. Riding a 
tide of new developments in communication technology and other opportunities opened up in 
the early 2000s, OAV advocates mobilised OFWs to help their cause and lobbied the 
Legislature and Executive of the Philippines for their voting rights. As a result of their 
ferocious lobbying, the OAV advocates won the voting rights for OFWs when Congress 
passes the OAV law in 2003. Adherents of the elite democracy model are bound to shrug off 
the OAV case for a hasty generalization about the increasing power of civil society actors in 
the Philippines. They would argue that the oligarchic elites still pervade in most elective 
offices in the Philippines and a lack of channelling function in Philippine political parties is 
an obvious sign that the oligarchic elites still dominate Philippine political landscape. 
However, as the OAV case demonstrates, politics in the Philippines does not only operate in 
state institutions; it also happens outside the Congress hall and Presidential palace. For 
example, the Internet was particularly significant in the OAV case. Knowing that Philippine 
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politicians had not responded to their formal appeal for the OAV legislation, OAV advocates 
chose to advertise the names of politicians considered obstacles to the passage of the law. The 
Internet offered an arena to spread the names among OFWs and other Filipino internet users. 
Given candidate-centred features and the importance of politicians‘ public image in 
Philippine politics, the naming strategy was an effective tool in the OAV lobby campaigns. 
Thus, while the Philippine political landscape may appear as dominated by the country‘s 
elites as ever, civil society actors have expanded their influence and initiated change through 
unconventional tactics.   
Lastly let me describe some disparity between the OAV case and both of the prevalent 
perspectives. One common trait of the patron-client model and the elite democracy 
framework is that the two models do not predict or accommodate the possibility of any 
change in Philippine politics; both approaches see the Philippine political system as operating 
in a more or less stable condition without any outside challenge. Decade after decade, 
competing patron-client factions or elite groups may be different in their composition, but the 
nature of the Philippine political system is expected to remain stable. In other words, the two 
perspectives have no room to accommodate change in Philippine politics. Thus, the fact that 
OAV advocates, as a civil society actor, lobbied Congress in a unified manner and challenged 
the elite-dominated Philippine politics is not appreciated by the prevalent explanations.    
Another misfit between the OAV case and the two approaches outlined above is the 
fixed view they provide of the behaviour of national politicians. Both approaches portray 
politicians as being solely influenced by self-interest and do not foresee any behavioural 
change in patrons when they enter into state institutions. The patrons-turned politicians are 
expected only to plunder state institutions not subject to their influence. The national 
politicians in the OAV case, however, seem not to have always behaved in this way. For 
example, one of the ICOFVR leaders, Daphne Kouk, said that several legislators were 
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empathetic allies to their cause and avidly supported the passage of the OAV law in 
Congress. Among the supporters, she said, was Senator Pimentel who often kept the ICOFVR 
leaders informed of discussions of the OAV issue in the Senate by sending them text 
messages.
20
 In addition to these examples, it is noteworthy that Philippine legislators made a 
gradual retreat from their hitherto uncompromising stand against the introduction of the OAV 
law for 16 years and finally passed the OAV law in 2003. What changed their staunch 
attitude? This study shows that it is because each politician has multiple identities such as a 
rent-seeking patron and a leader of the state. As state leaders, these politicians could no 
longer ward off OFWs‘ growing call for the right to vote because OFWs were tax-paying 
citizens that were being deprived of that basic right. Had it not been for the identity given by 
the state that politicians should serve public interests as well as plunder the state, they would 
have not budged from their hitherto hostile posture towards the OAV law.  
The role of the state is also pronounced in the OAV case as it did not merely influence 
the behaviours of politicians, it also shaped the way that OAV advocates lobbied for 
legislation.
21
 For instance, Chapter 5 reveals how the Philippine state raised expectations of 
OFWs by praising them as ―New Heroes‖, who saved the country from dire economic 
doldrums. The raised expectations of OFWs turned into disappointment however when they 
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 For this feature of the state, Timothy Mitchell gives an inspiring point to this study. Mitchell (1991: 93) 
presents a groundbreaking view on power of the state, not as necessarily a system of authoritative commands 
backed by force, but as disciplinary power that works in distinctive institutions. His alternative view is based on 
Michel Foucault‘s concept of ―disciplines‖. In his book Discipline and Punish, Foucault (1979) assesses 
disciplinary forms of power generated out of the performances of state apparatus such as construction of state 
apparatus, introduction of inspection and drill in the army. But Mitchell avers that the disciplinary power of the 
state cannot be overstated because resistance movements often take place not in society, but inside the state 
institutions. 
At the same time it follows that just as we must abandon the image of the state as a free-standing 
agent issuing orders, we need to question the traditional figure of resistance as a subject who 
stands outside the state and refuses its demands. Political subjects and their modes of resistance are 
formed as much within the organizational terrain we call the state, rather than in some wholly 
exterior social space. (Mitchell 1991: 93) 
Mitchell‘s insight that the state even nurtures resistance movements inside its apparatus provides this study with 
the idea that studying the state may reveal patterns of participation of social forces from below.  
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realised that no concrete policies followed the lip-service of the hero encomium, and this 
disappointment finally led to their avid support for the OAV legislation in 2003.  
Given its role in shaping the patterns of behaviours of politicians and advocates in the 
OAV case, it is necessary to shed light on the role of the state. The work of two Philippine 
scholars helped me develop criticism of the two prevalent models of Philippine politics 
outlined above. Let me briefly discuss the two scholars, John Sidel and Patricio Abinales, and 
their research into how the Philippine state shapes the behaviour of political actors. In his 
research on local strong men in the Philippines, Sidel (1999: 10-11) dismisses the elite 
democracy approach by noting that the ―strong landed oligarchy, weak state framework‖ 
downplays the role of the state and also fails to explain ―variation and change in the course of 
Philippine history‖. He then argues that the institutional structure of the Philippine state has 
shaped local despotism in Philippine history. By highlighting the critical role of state 
institutions, he rejects prevalent theories of Philippine politics as focusing too much on the 
strength of society. However, Sidel‘s study sheds partial light on the state‘s role; it does not 
discuss how state agencies moderate the exploitative self-interests of the political elites. In his 
work, the role of the state is confined to influencing the way local strong men expand their 
private control over local and national state agencies (Sidel 1999: 18-9). Thus, it is hard to 
find a positive influence of the state on national politicians.
22
  
Recognising the positive role of state institutions, Abinales (2000) addresses the 
question of why some political elites pay attention to public issues. In his book Making 
Mindanao, Abinales argues that answering this question requires a modification of the 
―strong society-weak state‖ argument of Joel Migdal (1988). In his book Strong Societies and 
Weak States, Migdal (1988: 33) argues that local strongmen such as chiefs, landlords, and 
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bosses successfully captured and plundered many states in the third world by allocating 
national resources to their liking. The predominant position of local strongmen in state 
structure, according to Migdal, was possible because ―weblike societies‖ that ―host a mélange 
of fairly autonomous social organizations‖ gave birth to fragmented social control, thereby 
keeping third world states at bay (Migdal 1988: 37). However, Abinales indicates that the 
Migdal argument cannot explain why, in the real world, supposedly ―weak‖ states are not 
broken down into many pieces. Regarding the reason, he suggests the resilience is derived 
from a persistent ambiguity shown in the state-society relationships of third world states. 
Criticizing Migdal‘s arguments for accepting ―the formalist assumption that state actors are 
different from and perennially in discord with their societal counterparts‖, Abinales argues 
that those in power do not have a clear distinction between their personal goals and public 
responsibility and therefore tend to undertake the role of state leaders and local strong men at 
the same time (Abinales 2000: 11-13).  
The insights of Abinales are useful for the OAV as they explain variability in 
behaviours of Philippine state actors. As articulated in the following chapters, Philippine 
legislators had showed a gradual change of attitude towards the OAV legislation during the 
16 years of postponement. For example, Representative Abaya said, in 2002, that he did not 
support the OAV law because it would cost too much for candidates‘ overseas campaigns, 
but he would vote yes on the bill for the fact that the OAV legislation was a constitutional 
mandate (House of Representative 2002b: 69). His speech shows that politicians were subject 
to the blurred line between their public responsibilities and private interests. Moreover, 
Abinales‘ account is able to explain the Philippine government‘s dual attitude towards 
OFWs, described in Chapter 5. While making constant compliments on OFWs‘ contribution 
to the country, the government implemented deregulation policies in the overseas 
employment industry, thereby causing public outcry among OFWs. This policy dissonance 
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shows that state actors, depending on their preferences between public and private interests, 
make their own choice on public policies.  
All in all, although the patron-client model and the elite democracy framework are still 
valuable in expounding some aspects of Philippine politics, those approaches are not able to 
explain three aspects of the OAV case. First, the patron-client model does not understand 
why OAV advocates were not in need of patronage and why politicians could not afford to 
reach overseas Filipinos. Since the model supposes patron-client relationships take place on a 
local scale, the ―international‖ interaction between OAV advocates and Philippine politicians 
is beyond the purview of this model. Second, the elite democracy adherents are preoccupied 
with elite competition in the state, thereby underestimating the effect of civil society actors‘ 
pressure on the political elite. In light of the flaws, the OAV case offers a counterexample: 
OAV advocates‘ lobby campaigns played a critical role in the OAV legislation. Third, both of 
the approaches have a rigid or fixed view of the Philippine political system. Adherents of the 
two theories seem to believe in rational actors who always seek their rent-seeking interest and 
in a stable system impervious to a possibility of change.  
In the next section, I discuss what alternative perspectives are appropriate to better 
understand the OAV case of this study.    
 
Alternative perspective: contentious politics framework 
 
To address the problems of misfits between the OAV case and the prevalent 
explanations, I suggest adopting an alternative perspective, the contentious politics 
framework. By presenting how the use of a contentious politics framework can explain the 
unexplained aspects of the two prevailing perspectives, I will show that a contentious politics 
framework is appropriate for explaining the OAV case.  
23 
 
Let me first discuss why a contentious politics framework explains the OAV case better 
than the two prevailing perspectives. First, by assuming that state actors and non-state 
challengers interact with one another over contentious issues, contentious politics framework 
presents a dyadic framework. Given the placement of the state instead of just the political 
elites at one end of this framework, a contentious politics model is useful in examining how 
institutional incentives and disincentives given by the state affect policy players such as the 
president and lawmakers and even OAV advocates. Therefore, by using this framework, this 
study can explain two unanswered puzzles under the prevalent explanations: the reason why 
some OAV supporters in the political elites existed and the way the government‘s contrasting 
policies influenced OFWs. Contrary to the patron-client model and the elite democracy 
approach, it can also assess how much impact the OAV advocates can make on the decision-
making of the OAV legislation. As will be explained later in this chapter, a contentious 
politics framework supposes that no matter how much the political elites dominate 
institutional decision-making processes, claimants can play a certain role provided they make 
an effective use of given political opportunities and unconventional strategies to press ahead 
with their goals.  
Second, a contentious politics framework can explain a long-term contention, such as 
the OAV issue, in a broader context. The prevalent theories cannot have comprehensive 
frameworks because they portray the political elites as a group pursuing self-interests and 
survival on top of other concerns. But it is a lopsided explanation to draw on the self-interests 
of politicians when dealing with the OAV case. To locate the matter in a broader context, a 
contentious politics framework draws on ―political opportunity structure‖ to understand how 
the state elites and the OAV advocates found and used external chances such as the drastic 
development of communication technology and the Asian economic crisis which occurred in 
the late 1990s. In addition, the examination of OFWs‘ collective grievances in contentious 
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politics framework can help explain why OAV advocates could easily mobilise OFWs for the 
OAV lobbying activities in the early 2000s.       
The abovementioned reasons offer groundwork for the detailed explanation of 
contentious politics framework. In the remainder of this chapter, I explain what a contentious 
politics framework is focusing on three main elements: political opportunities, mobilising 
structures and collective identity. In each account of the elements, I also discuss its relevance 
to the OAV case. 
According to McAdam, Tilly and Tarrow (2001:5),
 
contentious politics is defined as 
―episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when (a) at 
least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims and (b) the 
claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants‖. Instead of using 
the existent term ―social movements‖, McAdam and his colleagues try to transcend 
boundaries of various traditional contentious politics such as social movements, interest 
group politics, revolutions and even democratization process. The authors also challenge the 
existing boundary between institutionalized and non-institutionalized politics to better 
understanding ―the parallels and the interactions between the two‖ (McAdam et al 2001:6). 
The term contentious politics, in other words, is a comprehensive word that includes more 
kinds of contentious issues than social movements.  
As a general theoretical framework, this study employs a typical model of contentious 
politics framework, political process model. The model aims to offer a counter-argument to 
the hitherto prevalent theory in social movement literature: resource mobilization model.
23
 
Political process theorists dismissed resource mobilization model for being too economic in 
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its analysis, being difficult to distinguish from interest group politics and ignoring many 
emergent grassroots movements in the 1960s and 1970s (Tarrow 1998: 16). 
In his book The Political Process and Black Insurgency, 1930-1970, Doug McAdam 
(1982) first outlined the political process model. Criticizing resource mobilization theory for 
focusing too much on means available to movement elites, McAdam tried to explain the 
emergence and development of the black insurgency in the US, presenting an analysis of 
internal and external factors of the insurgency (McAdam 1982: 59). His attempt to capture 
these factors resulted in establishing the three main measurements of his political process 
model: (1) political opportunities, (2) indigenous organizational strength and (3) cognitive 
liberation. As many scholars reiterated his model, these three pillars are referred to as 
―political opportunity structure‖, ―mobilizing structure‖ and ―framing processes‖.  
As for the political opportunity structure, Sidney Tarrow (1998: 77) defines it as 
―consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the political 
environment that provide incentives for collective action‖. In the initial stage of social 
movements, political opportunity structure is considered as an important opening for social 
movements because it can provide movement activists with prospects to advance their claims 
and mobilize the mass (McAdam 1982, Tarrow 1998, Meyer 2004).  Many scholarly 
observations highlight the importance of political opportunities, arguing that there are no 
other stronger explanations than the consistent existence of political opportunities in the 
studies of social movements in Western societies (Meyer 2004: 127, Tarrow 1998: 72).  
Despite the fact that all contentious politics scholars concur in considering political 
opportunities highly important, there are disagreements over the scope of the political 
opportunity structure. While some scholars confine political opportunities to the changes of 
certain political indicators such as social cleavage structure, state capacity, and the alliance 
structure between polity members and challengers, others try to find new opportunities 
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affecting the emergence and development of contentious politics. As David Meyer 
(2004:135) notes, ‗opportunity variables are often not disproved, refined, or replaced, but 
simply added‘. The wide variation of political opportunity variables is surely, as Meyer 
describes, ‗extremely frustrating‘. But the variation is inevitable due to the differing contexts 
of each contentious issue. As long as a clear relationship is verified between opportunities 
and mobilisation of actors, contentious politics scholars can have an open-ended possibility to 
explore a variety of political opportunities in different settings.  
Another issue raised in the political opportunity structure is the tendency to describe 
most political opportunities as a given, perceived by only movement activists and claimants. 
Considering that a few scholars investigated how regime members or governments perceive 
and attribute political opportunities, more attention is needed on the use of political 
opportunities by state actors (McAdam et al 2001: 45, Boudreau 2004: 28). As Tarrow (1998: 
81) points out, one must carefully investigate state actors‘ interests in a given situation as 
well as considering structural factors such as state strength and strategies.  
The assessment of political opportunity structure in Chapter 2 is a result of the review 
above. As for the matter of what can be considered political opportunities, Chapter 2 has a 
mixed list of traditionally verified and newly found opportunities: the changed composition 
of political elites in state institutions, the Asian economic crisis, and the political motivation 
of President Arroyo. While the assessment of elite structure and economic crisis confirms that 
these opportunities are highly significant in explaining contentious politics issues, the account 
of President Arroyo‘s personal desire for re-election contributes to the making of political 
opportunity variables. By assessing how government actors responded to the economic crisis 
and the president‘s political motivation, I also try to expand the way political opportunities 
are interpreted. I hope my assessment can respond to the Tarrow‘s call for more attention 
towards how state actors manage given political opportunities.  
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The second pillar of political process model is ―mobilizing structures‖. McAdam, 
McCarthy and Zald (1996: 3) define it as ―collective vehicles, informal as well as formal, 
through which people mobilize and engage in collective action‖. As for the role of the 
―collective vehicles‖ in contentious politics, scholars have controversial debates over how 
much the types of movement organisations are related to the success of contentious politics 
movements. Some argue that every social movement organization inevitably falls into the 
trap of reutilisation as seen in the cooptation of movement leaders by the state and the change 
of movement goals from making their voices heard to maintaining their survival (Michels 
1962, cited from Tarrow 1998: 123). On the other hand, other scholars view social movement 
organizations as driving forces to empower and mobilize supporters by underscoring various 
aspects of organizational strength – members, leaders, communication networks between 
them (Moten 2002). With regard to confusion on the role of mobilizing structures, Tarrow 
(1998: 123) points out that the wrangle comes from the imprecise usage of the term. In 
seeking to make a clear distinction, he differentiates ―formal hierarchical organizations‖ from 
―connective structures‖. According to Tarrow, the former is more dominant form used by the 
adherents of the ―iron law of oligarchy‖ and the latter is indicative of informal networks. 
Since the two types of organisations have strengths and weaknesses, Tarrow argues that ―the 
most effective forms of organization are based on partly autonomous and contextually rooted 
local units linked by connective structures, and coordinated by formal organizations‖ (Tarrow 
1998: 124).  
The OAV case presents an interesting addition to the debate over the effect of 
organisation types. In Chapter 4, I analyse the ICOFVR, the main vehicle of OAV lobbying.  
The ICOFVR is a loose network connecting member groups by regular contacts of emails and 
internet messengers. Instead of having an office in the real world, it has several websites on 
the Internet to discuss and spread OAV lobbying strategies. It appears that the nature of this 
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loosely connected organisation counters Tarrow‘s suggestion; the ICOFVR does not have 
formal hierarchy and its members are even sprawled all over the world. However, Chapter 4 
reveals that the member groups of the ICOFVR are locally rooted OFW organisations in the 
world. After leaders discussed strategies to lobby Congress and the Philippine government, 
the conclusions from that discussion were soon spread to hundreds of ICOFVR member 
groups. Contrary to the informal structure of the ICOFVR, each member group has their own 
office and formal hierarchy. This mixed composition is one of the key elements in the success 
of OAV lobbying campaigns. I hope that the mobilising structure of the OAV case will offer 
a contribution to the debate; an informal and loosely connected organisation can be the 
―collective vehicle‖ in contentious politics when it is armed with technological tools to link 
them together and locally rooted member organisations.         
Whereas the former two elements of political process model concern the structure of 
contentious politics, framing processes as the last element deal with contentious politics 
actors and their collective identity. When Erving Goffman (1974: 21) first used the term 
‗framing‘, he described it as ―schemata of interpretation‖ for individuals ―to locate, perceive, 
identify, and label‖ events taking place around them. As political process theorists adopt his 
concept, they highlight more active roles of agents than the Goffman‘s description of them. 
For example, McAdam (1982: 48) notes that political opportunities and collective action need 
agents and their subjective interpretation of meanings. Tarrow (1998: 22) also underscores 
the role of agents by arguing that not only ‗what‘ framing agents do in contentious politics, 
but also ‗who‘ the framing agents are should be explored. According to Tarrow, some 
movement actors – polity members, the media, and movement actors – construct meanings in 
social movements and fashion these meanings in their favour. His work is significant for the 
fact that he proves that mass media and states do not always remain passive or defensive 
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when dealing with contentious politics issues. They oftentimes collude in framing processes 
for pro-government culture and even make counter-meanings against claimants‘ meanings.  
This study builds on the current literature of framing processes, thereby focusing on 
how the Philippine government and the media as well as OFWs constructed new meanings in 
the OAV case. For example, Chapter 5 shows what it means to be an OFW in the Philippines. 
With the surge of OFWs happening since the 1970s, the Philippine government, in tandem 
with the media, has made continuous attempts to promote overseas employment by depicting 
OFWs as ―New Heroes‖. This hero image was turned into a weapon by OFWs when they 
realised that the government was actually doing little to support them. The findings of 
Chapter 5 reveal that many actors contributed to the making of New Heroes and the meaning 
played a critical role in the OAV case.  
All in all, this chapter has discussed how the OAV case found its way to the alternative 
theoretical framework, contentious politics framework. I first elaborated on the features of the 
OAV case unexplained by the prevalent theories of Philippine politics: the power of OAV 
advocates on the OAV legislation and the role of the state in shaping the behaviours of 
politicians and OAV advocates. Due to the unexplained features, I turned to the examination 
provided by the political process model. The examination found the three elements of the 
model useful in explaining the OAV case because of their emphases on the state‘s role, 
external opportunities and the power of meaning. In the following chapters, I will apply these 
three elements to the OAV case. The main empirical chapters consist of the political 
opportunities of OAV case (Chapter 3), the mobilizing structure and repertoire of the 






Chapter 3. POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES  
 
This chapter serves as a backdrop to the next chapter, which will examine the OAV 
lobby organisation and the campaign strategies it adopted in the early 2000s. By explaining 
the complex socio-political environment in which the OAV lobby operated, I intend to 
outline some external opportunities given to related actors of the OAV issue. Of all, I 
highlight three opportunities: presidential support, the changed composition of Congress, and 




In post-Marcos Philippines, the president and their administration has always led 
initiatives for political reform. Before examining presidential support on the OAV legislation 
as part of the political reform initiatives, let me briefly mention why and when presidential 
support is critical in pushing for political reform agendas in Congress. The president of the 
Philippines has traditionally enjoyed a vast degree of constitutional power such as the power 
to veto items of appropriation bills and the control of national budget over pork barrel 
projects.
24
 This influential power of the president multiplies when it is combined with 
another longstanding feature of Philippine politics: the party-switching among legislators. 
This occurs because of the president‘s formidable control over pork barrel budgets as well as 
the identical ideologies and weak nature of political parties (Lande 1996: 120; Hutchcroft and 
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dependence on the president (Montinola 1999: 136; Parreño1998: 39).  
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Rocamora 2003: 278). For Philippine lawmakers, leaving their party does not incur them 
much cost as ―parties play a minor, if at all any, role in the recruitment of candidates, in 
financing their campaigns, and in shaping the political careers of their members‖ (Miranda 
1996: 37). Indeed, a similar pattern of party-switching has continued into the post-Marcos 
era. Whenever newly elected president comes to power, ―legislators switch to the party of the 
president shortly after elections, only to abandon that party when the president leaves office‖ 
(Eaton 2002: 95).   
These features of Philippine politics have contributed to the important role of the 
president in initiating legislation processes in Congress. Even if legislators are reluctant to 
pass a law in Congress, sometimes the president‘s power makes it happen (Magadia 2003: 
58; Brillantes and Amarles-Ilago 1994: 58). In the OAV case, however, Philippine presidents 
did not always push for it. There were specific periods of presidential support for the OAV 
legislation: the first several years of each administration. This is explained mainly by the 
election cycle of the Philippines. The 1987 Constitution stipulates a single six-year term of 
President, a six-year term of Senators and a three-year term of House members (Article VII, 
Sec 4; Article VI, Sec.4 and Sec.7)
25
. It also notes that presidential and legislative elections 
are held on the same date (Article VI, Sec 8 and Article VII, Sec 4). According to these 
provisions, the post-Marcos era witnesses presidential or legislative elections every three 
years. In this three-year cycle of national elections, it was at the time of the so-called ―mid-
term legislative elections‖ that presidents usually pushed for the OAV legislation.26 Under a 
single term provision, incumbent presidents are likely to deliver their election promises in the 
first few years to enlist support for the rest of their presidency and to ensure good 
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 The 1987 Constitution allows Senators and House members to seek re-election in two and three consecutive 
terms, respectively (Article VI, Sec.4 and 5).  
26
 The mid-term legislative elections take place in the middle of a president‘s term. Thus they are the only 
legislative elections held alone without presidential election. In the mid-term legislative elections, all House of 
Representatives and half of the Senate seats are filled.  
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performance of the ruling party in the mid-term legislative elections. As each presidency 
comes to an end and due to the constitutionally enshrined one term limit, no motivation 
remains for a president to actively support any political reform. Therefore, for OAV 
advocates, lobbying in the years leading up to the mid-term legislative elections is likely to be 
more effective than in other periods because of presidential support for political reform.  
Hence, it is necessary to take a closer look at the role of the president during the mid-
term legislative elections, when advocates pushed hard for the OAV legislation. As can be 
seen in Table 2, during the 16-year lobby of the OAV legislation, three presidents were in 
office at the time of a mid-term legislative election: Aquino, Ramos and Arroyo. Of the three 
presidents, I focus on the role of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, who finally signed the 
OAV bill into law in 2003, and then make a comparison between Arroyo and Ramos to 
demonstrate how and why Arroyo bothered to show active support for the legislation.
27
   
Table 2. Year of mid-term legislative elections under post-Marcos administrations 
President Year of mid-term legislative elections 
Aquino (1986-1992) 1987 
Ramos (1992-1998) 1995 
Estrada (1998-2001) N/A 
Arroyo (2001-2010) 2001, 2007 
Note 1. The provision of election cycle in the 1987 Constitution does not apply to the Aquino presidency. 
Note 2. The Estrada presidency was supposed to have a mid-term legislative election in May 2001, but the 
People Power II ousted him from the presidency in January 2001. Arroyo, then Vice President, succeeded to the 
presidency and was elected to a six-year presidential term in 2004.  
 
President Arroyo seemed to be a vocal supporter for the OAV bill. There is some 
evidence of her amiability toward it. First, she was one of the sponsors of an OAV bill (SB 
2488) when she was a senator in the tenth Congress (1995-1998). Asked her opinion as 
president of the OAV legislation, Arroyo drew on the sponsorship experience, saying that 
―[s]he had sponsored a bill—when she was in the Senate—to give the OFWs the means 
precisely to exercise that right‖. She continued to say that ―the OFW-Vote issue is part of the 
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 I do not examine the 1987 mid-term legislative election under Aquino because there were no incumbent 
legislators to be lobbied; it was the first legislative election after the downfall of Marcos. 
33 
 
administration‘s legislative agenda‖ (TMT Apr 1, 2001, 1B). Second, as a means of backing 
the OAV legislation, Arroyo publicly urged Congress to pass it when addressing the State of 
Nation Address in July 2001 and certified OAV legislation as urgent in May 2002. Given that 
presidential certification guaranteed a high possibility of legislation, her push for the OAV 
bill was more than a verbal support.
28
  
  Although Arroyo‘s support for the OAV legislation was vocal and significant, it is not 
enough to explain the successful passage of the OAV law in 2003. A legislative history 
reveals that such strong presidential support did not previously lead to passage of the OAV 
legislation. Take President Fidel Ramos for example. During his term from 1992 to 1998, 
Ramos spearheaded a drive towards enacting the Omnibus Election Code, which included the 
adoption of the absentee voting system, as part of his five-year modernisation plan. In 1993, 
Ramos also certified the OAV legislation with other electoral reform bills as an urgent 
administrative measure and pushed hard for the implementation of electoral reform in the 
1995 legislative election. However, legislators in the ninth Congress (1992-1995) deliberately 
failed to pass the bill on grounds that they were preoccupied with other urgent economic 
legislative issues (Emboltura 1995: 18).  
There were two reasons for explaining this failure of in the legislation‘s progress. First, 
the electoral reform agenda pushed by Ramos threatened the survival of the incumbent 
legislators in the next election. Although the OAV lobby ran high in the years leading up to 
mid-term legislative elections, legislators in Congress became more resistant to the OAV 
legislation because they did not want their election race to be disrupted in the incoming 
elections by introducing a new and unpredictable variable.
29
 Another reason was the 
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 In an email circulated among ICOFVR members, Ellene Sana an OAV advocate says that the first thing to do 
for successful the lobby is to make the OAV legislation as a certified measure by the president. She continues to 
say that ―historically, if a bill is not a priority bill of Malacanang [Presidential Palace], it does not really get 
anywhere…‖ (Bionat, forthcoming: 4) 
29
 The introduction of absentee voting was unpredictable because legislators were not able to know whether the 
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bicameral nature of the Philippine Congress. Unlike the House members, the twenty four 
senators are elected in a single, nationwide district. As they do not have narrowly defined sets 
of constituents, senators have fewer motivations to collaborate with the president than their 
counterpart in the House. Although senators are not entirely indifferent to particularistic 
policies such as pork-barrel practices, their interest in pork barrels is ―less geographically 
specific than that of house members and, more important, is offset by their interest in national 
policy‖ (Eaton 2002: 105).30   
Then how did the Arroyo administration overcome the ferocious opposition in 2003? 
To answer this question, we need a comprehensive analysis including consideration of the 
intensity of the OAV lobby campaigns, the composition of legislators and other external 
factors. Since the following chapters will examine other parts, I look here into two 
advantages given to the Arroyo administration: its domination of the twelfth Congress and 
the re-election chances of Arroyo.  
First let me indicate that the control of the Arroyo administration over Congress gave 
strength to the presidential support of the OAV legislation. When Arroyo was sworn in as 
President in January 2001, she was not an elected president. In accordance with Constitution 
(Article VII, Section 8), Arroyo took over the presidency from former President Joseph 
Estrada, after the People Power II forced him out of power. As a president who was not 
elected by popular vote, it was commented at the time that Arroyo suffered from lack of 
legitimacy (Economist Mar 5, 2001, 15). To be recognized as a legitimate leader, Arroyo and 
her political allies in Congress were in desperate need of winning the legislative election in 
May 2001, a ―de facto referendum on the legitimacy of the Arroyo government‖ (Labrado 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
considerable number of overseas Filipinos would be favourable to the incumbents and whether the government 
would manipulate election results in favour of ruling party candidates (Interview with Sana, Jun 3, 2008).  
30
 In addition, Senators‘ ambition to run for president makes them uncooperative to presidential support in the 
legislation process. It is natural that senators in the Philippines dream to be a president due to the fact that they 
are elected in a nationwide district, which needs resources and networks as much as that of presidential elections.    
35 
 
2002: 141). Thanks to their all-out efforts, the legislative election in May 2001 resulted in 
Arroyo‘s satisfactory victory. A government coalition, the People Power Coalition (PPC) 
comprising political parties sided with Arroyo secured a majority in both chambers (May 
2001: 677-78). It was also encouraging for Arroyo supporters that pro-Arroyo politicians 




Victory in the 2001 election put Arroyo in a favourable environment to initiate the 
OAV legislation and domination of Congress by the government coalition ensured 
presidential support on the OAV legislation after 2001 was even more significant than before. 
This increased influence is evident in what legislators stated about the OAV legislation in 
Congress. For example, on a third reading of the OAV legislation in the lower House, 
Representative Baterina explained why he would cast a yes vote to the OAV legislation 
although he was against it. 
Therefore, Mr. Speaker, although I would like to vote against the bill, considering 
that I am a member of the Majority and considering further that Speaker de 
Venecia is our leader in Region I, I cannot say a no vote, and I must vote yes, Mr. 
Speaker. I vote yes for the bill, Mr. Speaker. (House of Representatives 2002b: 
79) 
 
Representative Garin was against the OAV legislation, but said he knew that the OAV bill 
would be signed into law regardless of his objection. He also alluded to the influence of the 
president and the House speaker.  
The President is interested in this. And I am supposed to vote yes also because 
I‘m with the administration. I am with the President. I am also supposed to vote 
yes because I am friend of the Speaker and the Speaker is very active going 
around. (House of Representatives 2002b: 102) 
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 In his book Filipino politics, Wurfel (1988: 84) states that the power of presiding officers in both chambers 
traditionally ―exceeded only [by] that of the president himself.‖ In particular, Wurfel points out that the speaker 
in the House can influence his colleagues‘ voting with the power of control over the House budget.  
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Why then did the Arroyo administration push for the OAV legislation so hard? Given 
that political reform has been a popular issue welcomed by the public in Philippine politics, 
the explanation that Arroyo‘s desire to be a legitimate leader pressed her to initiate the OAV 
legislation as part of electoral reform seems to be a plausible account. In addition to this, 
however, I would like to point to an extra motivation of Arroyo: a chance of re-election. In 
2002, when the lower chamber discussed the OAV legislation, Representative Celso Lobregat 
commented on the re-election possibility of Arroyo. Claiming that the implementation of 
absentee voting should be postponed until after the 2004 presidential election, Lobregat 
raised doubt that Arroyo had pushed the OAV legislation strongly because she was the only 
president who could and would run for re-election in the 2004 presidential election (Journal 
of the House 2002: 51-52). His allegation was not unfounded. Although the 1987 
Constitution prohibits the re-election of the president (Article VII, Section 4), Arroyo was 




Indeed, in October 2003, Arroyo announced that she would seek re-election in the 2004 
presidential election. The 2003 announcement was a retraction of her previous promise in 
December 2002 that she would not run for the 2004 election. Based on her remarks, it may be 
logical to say that she did not think of re-election when she pushed for the OAV legislation in 
2001 and 2002, however, no one seemed to believe her initial promise not to run. According 
to The Economist, at the same time as ruling herself out in 2002, she seemed to ―hit the 
campaign trail‖ for the 2004 election by broadcasting her contention to fight for the poor 
majority of the population (Economist Dec 14, 2002, 63). It was also reported that ―few 
people were astonished‖ at the news of her change of mind, because ―many Filipinos were 
immediately sceptical‖ when Arroyo announced her retirement in 2002 (Economist Oct 11, 
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  According to the Constitution, Arroyo became President to serve the unexpired term of the deposed 
president, Estrada, in 2001 (Article VII, Sec. 8).   
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2003, 68). Academic commentators raised the same suspicions. Michael Montesano (2003: 
157) argues that Arroyo had ―every incentive‖ to govern the country with the 2004 election in 
mind and ―political opponents likewise showed every inclination to see her actions and 
decisions in intensely political terms‖.  
If it was the case that Arroyo had re-election in her mind even before her promise of 
retirement, the introduction of absentee voting in the 2004 presidential election must have 
been a critical issue for her because such a considerable number of overseas Filipinos were 
eligible voters and even undertake the role of a swing vote in the election.
33
 Given the fact 
many pundits opined Arroyo‘s re-election would be a close fight because of a series of 
corruption scandals and resultant poor approval ratings immediately before the presidential 
election, overseas Filipinos as a new electorate were not negligible for her re-election 
campaign (Economist Dec 14, 2002, 63).
34
 In the actual result of the 2004 election, Arroyo 
won re-election by narrow margin of approximately one million votes. Although the turnout 
of overseas Filipino voters was not as high as many had estimated
35
, the prediction of 
Arroyo‘s close fight in the 2004 election played a critical role in pressing on her to support 
the implementation of the OAV legislation in the 2004 election.   
 
The party-list system 
 
The second political opportunity that was given to OAV advocates was the entry of 
sectoral representatives in the House in 1998, known as the party-list system. The system was 
based on a constitutional mandate that the House should introduce proportional 
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 At that time it was estimated that the number of eligible voters among overseas Filipinos would be up to three 
and a half million (Senate 2002: 83). 
34
 In March 2003, satisfaction ratings of president Arroyo fell to a record low (-14%) since her rise to president 
(Social Weather Station 2007).  
35
 The number of absentee votes cast in the 2004 election was estimated to be around 230,000 (Miralao and 
Makil 2007: 127). 
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representation of marginalised sectors in one-fifth of its seats (Article XI, Sec 5). Although 
there were some flaws in the law
36
, the first party-list election in 1998 provided important 
opportunity for OAV advocates. Dozens of progressive candidates, some of whom were 
ardent supporters for the voting rights of overseas Filipinos, entered into a House that hitherto 
had been dominated by conservative political elites.  
Among 13 representatives elected in the 1998 party-list election, Representative Loretta 
Ann Rosales from Akbayan (Aksyon ng Sambayan or Citizens‘ Action Party) was the most 
influential and instrumental in the passage of the OAV law (Mercado 2006: 73). She was a 
long-time political activist who had lobbied for the absentee voting law before her 
congressional career began.
37
 After her election, Rosales continued to sponsor several OAV 
bills (HB 7243, HB 2747) filed in eleventh and twelfth Congress. Jaclaine Mercado (2006: 
116) notes that Akbayan‘s participation in the legislation process was ―vital in the passage of 
the OAV‖ in 2003, because there were strong similarities between Akbayan and OAV 
advocates. Like OAV advocates, Akbayan consisted of ―social movement groups‖ who 
wanted to ―be part of the formal processes of government‖ and the welfare of overseas 
Filipinos was one of its party platforms.
38
 Therefore Akbayan was approachable to OAV 
advocates and was willing to collaborate with them. Sharing the cause of civil society 
activism, Akbayan became a member of the ICOFVR and helped the OAV lobby campaigns 
since 1998. 
Akbayan also operated as a bridge between OAV advocates and the political elite. 
Since her entry into the House in 1998, Rosales has initiated discussions over OAV bills and 
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 It is indicated that the threshold level for each party-list group to grab a seat in the House of Representatives 
is so high (two percent of the total votes) that only 13 out of 122 groups were passed the threshold in the 1998 
election. In addition, no matter what percentage each group achieves, no more than three seats are allowed for 
one group (Co et al 2005: 89). 
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 Before being elected as party-list Representative, since 1994 Rosales was an Executive Director of the 
Institute for Political and Economic Reform (IPER) that had lobbied for electoral reforms including OAV issue 
(Interview with Rosales). 
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has undertaken a role of contact person for OAV advocates that hitherto had limited access to 
the OAV legislation process in Congress. As one of her efforts, in 1998, Rosales crafted a 
series of overseas consultations that arranged a meeting between Philippine embassy officials 
abroad, overseas Filipino organisations, and OAV advocates (Mercado 2006: 76). The 
consultations were meaningful in the history of the OAV lobby as this was the first time 
OAV advocates met Philippine embassy officials over the issue. In an interview, Rosales 
herself admitted that the consultations were possible thanks to her status as a legislator and 
her past career as a political activist.
39
   
 
The Asian crisis 
 
Along with political environment, there is a need to look into the contemporary 
economic situation in the Philippines. Contentious politics scholars have long pointed to 
economic crisis as a key player in political and social changes in third world states. For OAV 
advocates, an economic crisis in the Philippines provides significant opportunity to press the 
government because of a growing contribution of overseas Filipinos to the Philippine 
economy through the 1990s and 2000s. Particularly I focus on the Asian economic crisis in 
1997, considered a watershed event that resulted in the creation of an environment favourable 
to the OAV legislation.  
The Philippine government has long hailed Overseas Filipinos as ―New Heroes‖ who 
propped up the ailing Philippine economy for several decades. In fact, remittances from 
overseas Filipinos have increased by hundred-folds from 1975 to 2005 (DOLE 2006:1), 
thereby their economic contribution to the economy has been growing year after year. As to 
the importance of the remittances, the government also admitted that ―the gains from 
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 Interview with Rosales by the author (June 13, 2008). 
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overseas employment mattered most during years when gross domestic product (GDP) 
were[was] at their[its] lowest‖ (DOLE 2006: 4).  
 
Table 3. Overseas Filipinos‘ remittances: 1986-2003  
Year Amount (US$ million) Share to GNP (Percent) 
1986 680 3.4 
1987 792 3.6 
1988 857 3.4 
1989 973 3.4 
1990 1,181 3.9 
1991 1,500 4.6 
1992 1,770 4.8 
1993 2,230 4.7 
1994 3,008 4.1 
1995 4,878 4.7 
1996 4,307 5.1 
1997 5,742 5.3 
1998 7,368 6.6 
1999 6,795 7.1 
2000 6,050 7.9 
2001 6,031 9.3 
2002 7,189 9.7 
2003 7,578 10.1 
    Source: DOLE 2006 
 
Another good indicator to capture overseas Filipinos‘ economic contribution to the 
country is the proportion of their remittances to GNP. Table 3 reveals that the share has 
increased to ten percent over the last 17 years. Here it is noteworthy that the share stays lower 
than five percent prior to 1996 and increased considerably from 1997. This suggests the 
Asian crisis caused a severe dependence of the Philippine economy on the remittances from 
overseas Filipinos. Facing the crisis, for example, the government saw overseas Filipinos‘ 
remittances as a reliable source of foreign exchange that sustained an exchange rate for the 
Philippine peso. Thus it publicly asked overseas Filipinos for help, looking to them to save 
the embattled peso (PDI Oct 9, 2000, A7, PDI Oct 16, 2002, A2). President Arroyo also 
admitted that ―when the economy had a foreign exchange crisis, the consistent dollar inflows 
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[from overseas Filipinos] saved the economy from collapsing‖ (PDI Jun 8, 2001, A4). 
Responding to the calls for help, overseas Filipinos sent the copious amount of money to the 
Philippines during the crisis (Table 3). The international economic climate also helped 
overseas Filipinos to raise their leverage power as the Americas and Europe were in 
economically good shape at the time of Asian crisis. Particularly overseas Filipinos in the US 
were enjoying the ―surprising strong pace‖ of the US economy in the late 1990s (NYT May 1, 
1998, A1). Thanks to all these situations, overseas Filipinos emerged as an ―economic 
saviour‖ in the wake of the Asian crisis.  
 It is striking that the drastic increase in the proportion of GNP they contributed 
coincides with intensive lobby activities by OAV advocates in the late 1990s. As 
demonstrated in Chapter 5, OAV advocates made an effective use of the economic crisis in 
the Philippines and of the emerging pride of overseas Filipinos as an ―economic saviour‖ in 
the wake of the crisis. While reminding OFWs of the heroic role of overseas remittances in 
propping up the Philippine ailing economy, OAV advocates highlighted the contrasting 
treatment overseas Filipinos received in return such as the government‘s neglect of their 
plight and the imposition of hefty administration fees. Given the intense lobby campaign and 
increasing economic clout of the OAV lobby in the late 1990s and the early 2000s, they could 
place a heavier burden on the government than before and the government‘s perception of 
OAV advocates‘ emerging power is evident in sponsorship speeches during the OAV 
legislation process in Congress. Representative Rosales emphasised overseas Filipinos‘ 
heroic deeds that ―helped tremendously in stabilising [the] weak economy especially in times 
of economic crisis‖ (House of Representatives 2001: 40). Representative Chatto also 
highlighted the actual assistance of overseas Filipinos in the crisis by saying that, ―[t]he 
financial crisis which our country has experienced before and now also strongly gives us an 
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impression and a concrete idea that the OFWs remittances and contributions to this nation 
has[have] actually helped us kept[keep us] afloat.‖ (House of Representatives 2002b: 84). 
In this chapter, I have examined how various political opportunities provided a 
favourable environment for the OAV lobby campaign in the early 2000s. The presidential 
support in the years leading up to the mid-term legislative elections raised chances of the 
OAV legislation. In addition, initial lack of legitimacy and re-election bid gave Arroyo 
greater motivation than her predecessors to exert extra pressure on Congress in favour of 
introducing an OAV law. In the composition of Congress, the emergence of party-list groups, 
particularly Akbayan, in the House of Representatives was significant as it helped speed up 
the OAV legislation process that had often discarded due to a lack of congressional 
enthusiasm. Last but not least, the growing economic contribution of overseas Filipinos to the 
country provided both of the government and OAV advocates with a good rationale for the 
OAV legislation. 
However, it would be too hasty if I concluded that either the political or economic 
situation of the time was the sole reason for the passage of the OAV law in 2003. There are 
other areas that need to be examined. For example, the fact that Congress ―almost‖ passed the 
OAV legislation under President Estrada, who was not enthusiastic about the legislation, 
shows that president‘s strong support may not be necessary for the OAV legislation.40 The 
introduction of the party-list system in the lower chamber provides only partial explanation 
too. That the number of Akbayan Representatives in 2003 was only two demonstrates their 
limitations in pushing for the OAV legislation. Although it is obvious that Akbayan played as 
a mediator between political and civil society, two out of 262 Representatives were not 
enough to initiate the passage of the OAV act. As for the Asian crisis, the actual passage of 
the OAV bill in Congress happened five years after the crisis. Hence, the passage of the OAV 
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 In January 2001, legislators in both chambers were about to pass the OAV legislation on Third reading. They 
would have passed the law if Estrada impeachment had not distracted legislators (Mercado 2006: 77). 
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law was a mixed result with various causes rather than an immediate effect of economic 
crisis.  
To address the problems above, in the following chapters, I will shed light on how 
related actors were responding to the given opportunities. In Chapter 4, I will focus on the 
reactions of OAV advocates to these opportunities. An examination of the mobilizing 
structure of OAV advocates‘ lobby group, the ICOFVR, and its lobbying strategies will 
reveal that how OAV advocates made effective use of political opportunities to make their 




















Chapter 4. MOBILIZING STRUCTURE AND REPERTOIRE  
 
This chapter looks into the main mobilizing structure of an OAV lobby organisation 
and the strategies it employed during the OAV lobby campaign. Since the 1990s, hordes of 
overseas Filipinos organisations have made efforts to push for the OAV legislation. However, 
it was not until 2001 when diverse efforts converged into a concerted and truly international 
network, the International Coalition for Overseas Filipinos Voting Rights (ICOFVR). In this 
chapter I begin by tracing origins of this organisation and further examine its structure and 
lobbying strategies when the OAV lobby campaigns culminated in the early 2000s. 
 
Origins of the event 
 
After the 1987 Constitution mandated the legislature to enact the OAV law, there were 
consistent debates among overseas Filipinos on how to push lawmakers who were reluctant 
to translate the mandate into legislation. Some overseas Filipino groups like the Migrante 
International presented proposals to Congress and government whenever there was a change 
of administration
41
. The OAV activism gained its momentum in 1995, as all eyes were on the 
plight of OFWs in the wake of the abuse and exploitation cases of them in the Philippine 
media. The hanging in 1995 of a Filipina maid, Flor Contemplacion, in Singapore prompted a 
series of demonstrations and condemnations infuriated by the Philippine government‘s 
inability to stop the execution (PDI Mar 27, 1995, 1). Coupled with the run-up to the 1995 
legislative elections, the Contemplacion issue forced government to overhaul the overseas 
employment sector and attend to the plight of OFWs.  
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With mounting attention on OFWs, talk of giving overseas Filipinos the voting rights 
abounded in the media (PDI May 14 1995; PDI May 21 1995, 9). Accordingly, pressure from 
overseas Filipinos was mounting from this time. In 1997, a local civil society group 
KAKAMMPI (Kapisanan ng mga Kamag-anak ng Migranteng Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc) 
initiated lobbying activities for the OAV legislation, such as presenting a petition and 
monitoring discussions in Congress. KAKAMMPI cooperated with a Europe-based overseas 
Filipino organization, the Platform of Filipino Migrant Organizations in Europe in their 
efforts to organise two advocacy visits to the Philippines in 1999 and 2000. However, 
according to an advocacy officer of KAKAMMPI and Co-ordinator of the ICOFVR, Ellene 
Sana, lobbying activities for the OAV legislation were ―passive and lacklustre‖ before 2001 
in the sense that OAV advocates were simply ―reactive‖ to discussions in Congress and ―did 
not really make any interventions.‖42  
Sana remembers that the year 2001 was a watershed in overseas Filipino activism for 
the OAV legislation. Despite the fact that many overseas Filipino groups in Europe and Asia 
lobbied the Congress for the passage of the OAV bill in the 1990s, it was 2001 that overseas 
Filipinos realized their power as one unitary lobbying group. In 2001, the OAV activism met 
another turning point when the second People Power uprising in Philippine history ousted 
President Estrada from power. The sacking of Estrada gave OAV advocates both frustration 
and an opportunity at the same time. The frustration came after legislators of the eleventh 
Congress shelved an OAV bill that had reached its third reading at that time because of their 
preoccupation with Estrada‘s impeachment trials. Despite being in dismay, OAV advocates 
found a hope in the anti-Estrada protests that unseated the incumbent president in the name of 
the will of the Filipinos. Overseas Filipino participation in the ouster campaign revolved 
around an online petition website, E-lagda (literally meaning ―e-signature‖). Thanks to its 
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location in cyberspace, the anti-Estrada campaign via E-lagda readily gained support from 
Filipinos all around the world. Their support even led to the establishment of several E-lagda 
chapters in the world. Apart from being signatories, overseas Filipinos joined so-called ―text 
barrage‖ by sending a deluge of text messages to Philippine senators who deliberated on the 
impeachment trial at that time
43
. The online campaign prompted a series of offline protests 
demanding the resignation of Estrada ―in major cities of Asia, Europe and North America‖ 
(CNN Dec 14, 2000).
44
 Many Filipino community leaders abroad agree that the E-Lagda 
campaign raised the political awareness of overseas Filipinos and further led to the formation 
of the ICOFVR.
45
 In other words, overseas Filipinos‘ experience in the anti-Estrada 
campaign inspired them to have effective means to influence Philippine politics. Although 
the OAV legislation ended up being shelved again, the impeachment incident became a 
significant event in the history of overseas Filipino activism because it was the first time that 
OFWs had made their voices heard in Philippine politics. 
It could be argued that overseas Filipinos had already been active to in opposition to 
martial law under the Marcos regime in the 1970s and 1980s. However, the anti-Estrada 
campaign differentiates itself from the anti-Marcos campaign in terms of its strategies and 
organizational strength. The most significant difference is the use of the Internet in the 
former. Thanks to the development of communication technology at the turn of the century, 
overseas Filipinos in the anti-Estrada campaign could access Philippine news in real time. 
Given the fact that the Philippine Daily Inquirer, the most widely read newspaper in the 
Philippines, first promoted its website address on its paper in August 1997, many overseas 
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 In an interview with the Philippine Daily Inquirer, Daphne Kuok, a leader of the ICOFVR, acknowledged the 





Filipinos could easily access to Philippine news via the Internet by the time Estrada‘s 
impeachment trial took place in 2000. Moreover, as can be seen in Table 4, overseas Filipinos 
had a greater edge over local Filipinos in accessing the Internet. The Internet enabled 
overseas Filipinos to keep abreast of Philippine news. Reactions to the news were also swift 
owing to the existence of electronic mails between internet users and short text messages 
between mobile phones. These technological advances enabled overseas Filipinos to connect 
with fellow expatriot Filipinos as well as to respond quickly to homeland affairs.  
Table 4. Comparison of internet penetration rates between top five OFWs‘ 
destinations and the Philippines in 2000 
 Population 
(Year 2000) 




Saudi Arabia 22,023,506 200,000 0.90 
Hong Kong 7,116,302 2,283,000 32.08 
Taiwan 22,191,087 6,260,000 28.20 
Japan 126,549,976 47,080,000 37.20 
Italy 57,634,327 34,708,144 60.22 
Philippines 81,159,644 2,000,000 2.46 
Sources: CIA World Factbook 2000,  
       Internet World Stats (http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm) 
 
To look into how overseas Filipinos make use of changing type of communication, let 
me compare two op-ed articles written by overseas Filipinos in the Philippine Daily Inquirer. 
On 28 November 1994, an overseas Filipino worker in Saudi Arabia, Jojo Maghirang, voiced 
his political opinion, looking for a ―Pen pal for OCW [Overseas Contract Workers] cause‖. 
Lamenting the fact overseas Filipinos‘ opinions were not properly represented in Congress, 
he said it was ―high time for us OCWs worldwide to unite and organize to form a common 
union‖ and he further urged fellow overseas Filipinos ―unite and launch a common, 
independent, solid action that will help elevate and uplift the dignity of the OCW‖ (PDI Nov 
28, 1994, 10). At the end of the opinion article, Maghirang left his mail address, suggesting 
all overseas Filipinos correspond with him. He averred, ―I am committing myself to respond 
to your letters‖. Although he did not keep readers updated concerning the progress of his plan 
48 
 
to establish a new organization for overseas Filipinos, we can conclude that he may have 
failed from Representative Osmena‘s response to the shelving of OAV legislation by the 
ninth Congress. Osmena recommended overseas Filipinos ―organize themselves and link up 
with other Filipino groups abroad to put pressure on Congress‖ (PDI Sep 14, 1995, 9). In 
light of the congressman‘s exhortation, Maghirang‘s commitment must have come to an end 
without tangible results.  
Six years later, another political opinion of an overseas Filipino shows a stark 
difference from that of Maghirang. On 28 October 2000, when the anti-Estrada movement 
was enjoying significant momentum thanks to the outbreak of corruption scandals of 
President Estrada, an overseas Filipino worker in Saudi Arabia, Peter Tan, affirmed that 
―OFWs in Saudi Arabia are not apathetic and indifferent to all of this [happening in the 
Philippines]‖. Tan continues to substantiate his statement by saying ―I keep abreast of the 
latest news from home through various sources like TV and radio broadcasts and the 
Internet‖ (PDI Oct 28, 2000, A8). Leaving his email address at the end of the opinion article, 
Tan continued to ask fellow readers, ―[h]ow can I contact church-based groups or civic 
organisations in the Philippines and obtain their e-mail addresses so we can communicate to 
them our support?‖ Here we can see that technological advances did not merely link up 
overseas Filipinos with affairs taking place in the Philippines. By 2000 they even enabled 
overseas Filipinos to be part of historic events by showing their support and actually joining 
those events.  
Against the backdrop of the development of communication technology and its 
practical use in the late 1990s, many overseas Filipinos experienced new types of political 
participation in the anti-Estrada movement. The remainder of this chapter shall examine how 




Mobilizing structure of the ICOFVR 
 
In 2001, the ICOFVR (International Coalition for Overseas Filipinos Voting Rights) 
came into being as a loose international network consisting of OAV advocate groups from all 
over the world. As implicated in the title, the organisation aimed at pressing Congress on the 
OAV legislation. It included more than 400 overseas Filipino organisations and individual 
members.
46
 Interestingly most of the member groups were not politically oriented at all; 
many were mere sports clubs, social and religious groups and this demonstrates that the 
ICOFVR was not a group of elite civil society activists. Many ordinary Filipino organisations 
abroad shared the cause that overseas Filipinos were entitled to have the voting rights. As will 
be stated later, the diverse composition was also significant in that it allayed some legislators‘ 
doubt whether all the overseas Filipinos actually wanted the voting rights. By exhibiting the 
list of ordinary overseas Filipino groups in the ICOFVR and their signatures, OAV advocates 
convinced legislators that the OAV campaign was not a plot of lustful activists or of an 
administration that was deemed to manipulate absentee voting in its favour.    
The ICOFVR had neither an office nor official website, but did have some active 
member groups and individual members who translated lobby strategies into practice. The 
active members contributed to the OAV lobby campaigns by bringing all the member groups 
together in unity and by keeping the organisation from being fluidised. Among the active 
member groups was a Philippine-based NGO for migrant workers, the Center for Migrant 
Advocacy (CMA) that served as the main engine for unitary lobbying activities. In particular, 
Ellen Sana, the executive director of the CMA and coordinator of the ICOFVR, was in charge 
of arranging online meetings and lobbying activities and also for informing member groups 
about any progress of the OAV legislation in Congress.    
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 The number of member groups can be found in a newspaper advertisement of Philippine Daily Inquirer (June 
4, 2002) posted by the ICOFVR.  
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Although Sana and her colleagues based in the Philippines initiated most of the 
lobbying activities of the ICOFVR, the organisation was not a ‗formal hierarchical 
organisation‘ led by a small group of cadres. Philippine-based members were significant only 
because – due to their location in Metro Manila, Philippines – they were the only OAV 
advocates who could access legislators in Congress. In fact, the ICOFVR was a rather 
decentralised organisation loosely connected among member groups by online 
communication such as online messengers and electronic mails. Sana and her colleagues in 
the Philippines did not dominate the flow of information and knowledge among member 
groups. Rather, Sana believed that the CMA served as a funnel point where the voices of 
overseas Filipinos could converge and exert unified pressure on Congress. Sana believed it 
important that ways were provided in which all member groups could participate in the OAV 
lobbying activities as a high number of overseas Filipino participants could convince 
legislators that all overseas Filipinos wanted the right to vote in forthcoming elections.
47
  
In interview with the author, Mike Bolos, a co-convenor of the ICOFVR, also identified 
new means of electronic communication as vital to the creation of an international network of 
support.
48
 The email communication provided a unity and spontaneity for ICOFVR members 
that enabled them to share every bit of information and mobilize for imminent lobbying 
activities. By corresponding one another by emails, ICOFVR members could arrange a series 
of lobbying activities such as letter-writing campaigns and delegation visits that had hitherto 
been initiated in jumbled manner. Once they had an online discussion, the results were 
readily disseminated to ICOFVR chapters in Europe and the Americas. At the same time 
some members made postings about OAV legislation on various websites. Of the websites, 
―Voting Rights for Filipino Migrants: Campaign Central‖49 served as a central information-
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sharing point on the Internet. On the Campaign Central, ICOFVR members regularly updated 
the news on their lobby campaigns conducted from September 2001 and also uploaded 
newspaper reports, columns and editorials related to the issue.  
While the Campaign Central functioned as a source of all the information on the OAV 
issue, another website, Pinoy Exchange, provided a public arena in cyberspace by opening a 
forum, ―Absentee Voting Bill: The Power is within your reach!‖.50 In this public arena, 
overseas Filipinos discussed their lobbying strategies, persuaded sceptical onlookers, 
recruited volunteers for joining a delegation visit to the Philippine Congress, and asked for 
donations. The existence of the online forum was true evidence that overseas Filipinos 




The rise of online communication not only served as glue binding together dispersed 
overseas Filipinos, but also facilitated the lobby activities of OAV advocates against 
Philippine legislators. As will be stated below, the opportunities provided by the Internet such 
as open access and swift dissemination of information forced legislators, who had to care 
about their popularity for re-election, to be more receptive than before to the voices of 
overseas Filipinos.
51
 Therefore, the Internet enabled overseas Filipinos to influence domestic 
issues in the Philippines. Before the Internet era, all they could do was visit Congress and 
persuade every congressman to support OAV legislation or influence family members still 
resident in the Philippines to not cast votes for those who were reluctant to pass the OAV 




 In the Philippines, being publicly known as a legislator who is in opposition to the welfare of overseas 
Filipinos is a big loss for their re-election. It is mainly because overseas Filipinos are the so-called National 
heroes or economic saviours for the country.  See Chapter 5 for more details.  
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legislation (PDI, May 7, 1990, 7). Both of these approaches were unsuccessful and individual 
efforts made little or no impact on the domineering political elite in the Philippines.  
In the early 2000s, the lobbying strategies of OAV advocates changed drastically from 
the individual efforts into more effective mass approaches with the help of the Internet. As 
the opposition legislators tried to derail the OAV legislation in August 2002, the ICOFVR, 
for the first time, initiated an aggressive campaign, Tanggalan Ang mga Lintik Na Sagabal at 
Inutil na Kongresista (TALSIK, meaning kick out the scum in Congress). The campaign 
advocates directly named seven congressmen who were accused of blocking the passage of 
OAV bills deliberated on at that time.
52
 They continued to assail them, arguing that the seven 
lawmakers tried to allow overseas voters to vote in only one election. In addition to the 
fingerpointing strategy, OAV advocates also campaigned to vote out of office the dissenting 
politicians (Bionat, forthcoming: 128). The names of the opposition politicians were soon 
diffused through online websites as well as the media.
53
 In departure from the previous 
strategy of non response or entire neglect, this time the accused congressmen lashed out 
against the campaigners with resentment. Of the seven legislators, Representative Didagen 
Dilangalen even threatened the ICOFVR members with a law suit. The legislators‘ furious 
reaction can be explained by a concern about the impact of the campaign. With re-election in 
mind, the legislators were very uncomfortable to see their names cast in so negative a light on 
the Internet where every Filipino could watch (PDI, Aug 28, 2002, A8). Although the 
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 The names of seven House of Representatives are as follows: Representative Escudero, Dilangalen, Locsin, 
Lobregat, Zamora, Remulla, and Fuentebella. The opposition stemmed from their sceptical view on the OAV 
legislation that there were ―not enough safeguards in the bill that would guard against possible fraud‖ and 
overseas Filipinos ―may not be as hot as we are here on this absentee voting bill‖ (PS Jan 23, 2002). 
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 The Campaign Central website provided a list of support/non-support politicians under the name of ―score 
card‖ (http://www.philippineupdate.com/scorecard_house.htm). In the Pinoy Exchange forum, 
(http://pinoyexchange.com/forums/archive/index.php/t-16707.html), overseas Filipinos shared the names of the 
dissenting politicians in Congress. In the case of the media, a horde of newspapers announced the names in their 
coverage (Arab News Aug 26, 2002, http://www.arabnews.com/?page=10&section=0&article=18098&d=26& 
m=8&y=2002; TMT Aug 12, 2002, B4). 
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campaign advocates later had to revoke the naming strategy
54
, the TALSIK campaign was a 
good example of using the Internet that appealed to the public and the media, thereby 
exerting pressure on legislators.  
There were also other lobby strategies of the ICOFVR, ranging from signature 
campaigns and so-called ―email barrages‖ to sending delegates to Congress. Of all the 
strategies, signature campaigns were the most widely used among ICOFVR members. Based 
on the success of online signature campaigns in the anti-Estrada movement, the E-lagda as a 
member of the ICOFVR, initiated another online petition for the OAV legislation (Rodriguez 
2002: 351). Offline petition movements were also active. A host of overseas member groups 
initiated signature movements in Germany, US, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE, Singapore, and 
Northern Mariana Islands. In these countries, ICOFVR members visited popular gathering 
places of overseas Filipinos and collected signatures, on days of special events such as the 
celebration of Independence Day.
55
 The advocates then delivered the collected signatures to 
congressmen either when there was a public hearing on the OAV issue in overseas countries 
or when delegates of overseas Filipinos visited the Philippines.
56
  
Whereas the signature campaign was a passive strategy in that it only enabled 
supporters to sign their names, letter and email writing campaigns needed more active roles 
by supporters and exerted more direct pressure on congressmen in the Philippines. Campaign 
advocates used the Internet in the way that these writing campaigns were conducted. They 
made postings of a template of the OAV petition letter on the Campaign Central website and 
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 In interview, Sana said they had to withdraw because the strategy offended congressmen too much, causing 
bad effects on discussions of OAV bill in Congress (Interview with Sana). 
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 In the Campaign Central website, an overseas Filipino activist in Saudi Arabia described how his group 
members conducted a signature campaign in 2001 for the passage of the OAV bill 
(http://www.philippineupdate.com/voices.htm). 
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 A report of Arab News (Aug 26, 2002, http://www.arabnews.com/?page=10&section=0&article=18098&d 
=26&m=8&y=2002) confirms that an OAV advocate in Saudi Arabia brought copies of the 15,000 signatures to 
a bicameral hearing held in Riyadh in March 2002.  
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other member organisations‘ websites for overseas Filipinos to download and use it.57 The 
websites also provided email addresses of the twelfth Congress legislators, so that overseas 
Filipinos could send emails to them. Sometimes overseas Filipino supporters printed out 
letters and handed them to ICOFVR members in the Philippines. The Philippine-based 
ICOFVR members delivered these letters to the mailboxes of congressmen whenever they 
visited Congress to participate in committee meetings and to monitor plenary sessions.
58
   
In addition to the letter and email writing campaigns, the ICOFVR also encouraged 
members to send text and fax messages, and to make phone calls to legislators in the 
Philippines. These strategies aimed to target congressmen more directly. For example, when 
Philippine-based ICOFVR members attended committee meetings and plenary sessions in 
Congress, they contacted overseas Filipino supporters when there were adjournments. On 
receiving calls, ICOFVR members abroad began making phone calls and sending text 
messages to congressmen of the constituency they belonged to or that they were randomly 
assigned by the organisation (PMRW 2004: 84).   
The OAV advocates were also adept at using their economic leverage when they 
pressurise Philippine politicians: (stop) sending remittances. As an OAV bill was stalled in 
Congress in 2002, some overseas Filipino groups explicitly threatened politicians in the 
Philippines with ―partial remittance boycott‖ (PDI 26 Aug 2002, A10; PDI 27 Sep 2002; PS 
1 Oct 2002, p3). Rhoel Mendoza, an OAV advocate, seemed to know what their forte was.  
If our smart lawmakers are cybersavvy, then they should know that there are now 
plans of pushing through with that [remittance] boycott and this time 
OFs[Overseas Filipinos] are dead serious in implementing it if only to show that 
they have had enough and are no longer taking thing sitting down (PDI 26 Aug 
2002, A10). 
 
Some OAV advocates alluded to the political use of overseas remittances. When the 
implementation of absentee voting faced a financial difficulty because of the lack of funds, 
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President Arroyo once said that the ―government might take organizations of overseas 
Filipinos on its offer to help finance the implementation of the absentee voting‖. She also said, 
―[o]ur overseas Filipinos who lobbied hard for this bill said they will do their share in the 
logistics. So now, we have to take them up in their offer‖ (Malaya 03 April 2003, p2). Her 
remarks shows that OAV advocates have influenced Philippine politicians with their financial 
offer.     
These campaigns were not just directed toward congressmen, they also aimed to lobby 
the media. It was understood that media coverage could mobilize more supporters by 
publicising the issue. In August 2002, ICOFVR members sent emails to editors and 
columnists of national newspapers in the Philippines to garner support by grabbing public 
attention (Saudi Gazette, 24 August 2002).
59
 In his column in The Manila Times, Rene Q. 
Bas, a journalist and ardent OAV advocate, admits that he received ―scores of e-mail[s]‖ 
from overseas Filipinos and quotes one of the e-mails received: 
Fifteen years have come and gone and still the constitutionally mandated 
Absentee Voting Bill is nowhere in sight for us OFWs. We are sick and tired of 
waiting for our legislators to do their job of passing the bill into law that has long 
been debated and rehashed many times over either out of malice, ignorance or just 
plain grandstanding by some legislators. …Would you please help us, the millions 
of OFWs around the world by drawing attention to our clamor for the passage of 
the Absentee Voting Bill so that we may not only become the country‘s economic 
saviors but its political saviors as well. (TMT Aug 25, 2002, A7) 
 
As noted above, overseas Filipinos‘ appeal to journalists was based on the fact that the OAV 
legislation was a constitutional mandate and many journalists expressed sympathy with the 
cause of the overseas Filipino advocates. In the same vein, an independent journalist 
Jeremaiah Opiniano admits the importance of their appeal. Asked of the reasons for 
increasing media coverage on the absentee voting issue after 2000, he states that the issue 
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―has long attracted media attention given the implications of the topic and the OAV lobby on 
journalists ―intensified at the turn of millennium until the law was passed in 2003‖.60 As a 
result, many newspapers released editorials, columns and media coverage on the OAV issue 
in the early 2000s.
61
 The lobby even produced several ardent supporters in the media. For 
instance, in 2002, a columnist of The Manila Times, Rene Q. Bas drew support from 
President Arroyo after asking for her opinion on the OAV issue in a press meeting with the 
president. After the meeting, Bas wrote a column, declaring that President Arroyo to be in 
favour of the introduction of absentee voting (TMT, Apr 1, 2001, 1B) and even emailed some 
ICOFVR members about the news when he ―just got home‖ from the press meeting.62  
Among the lobbying activities, a delegation visit to the Philippines in 2001 is 
considered the most important because it directly showed politicians the desire of overseas 
Filipinos for the passage of the OAV law and also effectively grabbed media attention. Prior 
to the ICOFVR‘s delegation in 2001, there had been two previous delegations in 1998 and 
2000. What distinguishes the 2001 visit from others is the composition of delegate members. 
Whereas previous delegations consisted mainly of overseas Filipinos from Europe, members 
of the 2001 delegation came from Australia, Guam, Hong Kong, Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and US as well as twenty European countries.
63
 For 
the five-day-visit to the Philippines in August 2001, more than 50 overseas Filipinos from all 
over the world had a meeting with President Arroyo and other government officials. The 
delegates also consulted with high-profile politicians in both chambers to accelerate the 
ongoing processes of enacting the OAV bill (KAKAMMPI 2001).  
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Meeting with high-profile politicians is more than symbolic lobbying activity. As 
indicated in Chapter 3, president‘s role in legislation has been important in Philippine 
politics. ICOFVR members were also well aware of the power of president, thus their 
lobbying efforts revolved around scheduling an audience with President Arroyo. An email 
circulated among ICOFVR members in February 2001 shows that OAV advocates made their 
full effort to contact the president. 
In short, back to square one. This early, we can of course lobby intensely the office 
of the president to make it a priority bill (endorsed by Malacañang), because 
historically, if a bill is not a priority bill of Malacañang, it does not really get 
anywhere ... (Bionat, forthcoming: 6)  
 
These successful lobbying activities of the ICOFVR have some implications. The first 
and foremost implication is its autonomous nature. No overseas Filipino groups forced their 
members to join the lobby campaigns, but many overseas Filipinos volunteered to be part of 
the lobby. Their autonomous participation was evident in the way their activities were 
financed. Although the Internet lowered the costs of communication and lobby, there were 
large-scale events in the course of the campaign (e.g., media conferences, newspaper 
advertisement, and delegation visits) that needed a considerable amount of money. According 
to some ICOFVR members, overseas Filipinos themselves financed all of the lobbying 
activities ranging from making banners to delegation visits
64
. When the ICOFVR planned to 
have banners and streamers draped along the road to the Batasang Pambansa (National 
Legislature) in August 2002, it was overseas Filipinos in Japan that made the banners and 
streamers were and sent them to the Philippines.
65
. When the ICOFVR delegation visited the 
Philippines in September 2001, delegate members paid their own airfares and 
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accommodation costs. ICOFVR raised a fund for the visit (the Common Fund) to pay extra 
expenses of the five-day visit such as transportation, food and logistics.
66
  
Another example of OAV advocates‘ self-finance was in the placing of an 
advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer. To mark the Migrant Workers Day on June 7, 
2002, the ICOFVR planned to post an advertisement to publicise their cause for the voting 
rights. To provide payment for the advertisement, which cost 142,000 Philippine pesos, Ellen 
Sana emailed other ICOFVR members asking for a financial donation in early June 2002. 
Members responded to it swiftly, most of the offerings arrived in the same month.
67
 As of 
August 13, she collected 225,431.11 pesos from 24 individuals and 21 organisations (See 
Appendix 3). All of the donators were overseas Filipinos living or working in various 
countries: Canada, Hong Kong, Kuwait, Netherlands, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, 
US, and UK.  
A broad range of support around the globe was possible due to a sense of belonging and 
trust among overseas Filipinos. As an example, in interviews conducted by the author with 
three ICOFVR members (Ellene Sana, Daphne Kouk and Mike Bolos), I was told of an 
occasion during the course of the funding campaign when this was particularly evident. 
According to Sana, even though many individual members and organisations pledged to 
donate money by emails, she was not sure they would keep their promises and did not know 
how to pay the fee for the advertisement that had to be paid in advance. Upon hearing of this, 
Mike Bolos, an ICOFVR member in Saudi Arabia at that time, asked his sister in the 
Philippines to hand in a certain amount of money (64,574 Philippine peso) to Sana first, so 
that Sana could pay the advertisement and then return the money to Bolos later when she 
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received the contributions from the promised donators.
68
 Asked by the author what made 
him willing to pay such a hefty cost without knowing Sana personally, Bolos answered
69
,  
That‘s the beauty of ICOFVR. It‘s the first organization that put everybody 
together. We don‘t know each other but we trusted and moved forward one 
direction. It‘s the only organization that I know of what everybody joins together 
for a cause. … We don‘t know each other. We just did what we had to do 
(Interview by the author, 6 July 2008). 
 
When explaining it, he was calm and certain. This was a general sentiment shared by overseas 
Filipinos who ardently took part in the OAV lobbying activities.   
 
Effectiveness of OAV lobbying strategies  
 
After the intense lobby campaigns of ICOFVR members, both chambers of the 
Philippine Congress finally passed the OAV legislation on 21 Oct 2002 (House of 
Representatives) and on 22 October 2002 (Senate) with overwhelming yes votes.
70
 The 
voting results seem to show that the OAV lobby campaign was effective. However, as 
mentioned in Chapter 3, there are many elements connected to one another in the OAV 
legislation process. To analyse independently the effects of the lobbying strategies on the 
successful legislation, I must return to the reasons why legislators were reluctant to pass 
OAV legislation for 16 years, and examine the extent to which OAV lobbying activities 
eased the concerns of legislators. 
There were three reasons for the 16-year delay in enacting the OAV legislation. First 
and foremost were concerns about electoral fraud among legislators. Philippine elections are 
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notorious for fraudulent practices such as vote-buying and administrative lapses (Velasco 
2006: 100). That the tallying and canvassing of ballots are conducted manually also heightens 
the opportunity for electoral fraud in the Philippines.
71
 Because of this likelihood, whenever 
a bill allowing overseas Filipinos to vote was deliberated in Congress, many legislators from 
opposition parties, showed their distrust towards the administration and the ruling party. It 
was often insisted that the government would manipulate absentee ballots in favour of ruling 
party candidates. For example, in February 1998, opposition Representative Joker Arroyo 
commented that he ―found it strange that the absentee voting bill was suddenly pulled from 
legislative shelves‖ and warned that ―the administration could use the absentee voting bill‖ to 
―ensure the victory of its candidates‖ in the coming election (PDI Feb 14, 1998, 7). This kind 
of suspicion was also widespread among opposition party members when the twelfth 
Congress (2001-2004) deliberated on the OAV legislation (PS Jan 23, 2002). For example, 
Representative Abaya said,  
Mr. Speaker, candidates of the administration will have a decisive edge over 
candidates of the opposition because as spelled out in the bill, the OFWs will have 
to vote in Philippine embassies abroad and we all know that from the ambassador 
down to the last clerk, they are all appointees of the administration. (House of 
Representatives 2002b: 69) 
 
These concerns about electoral fraud reveal a fact that legislators could not ignore the 
increasing number of overseas Filipinos. Since it was expected that more than 3.5 million 
overseas Filipinos would be entitled to cast absentee ballots, the considerable number was 
deemed to operate as a casting vote if their votes were manipulated collectively. Even if they 
had no worries about electoral fraud, legislators would not be willing to pass the OAV bill 
because they had no clue whether overseas Filipinos were hospitable to the re-election of 
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incumbent legislators. Moreover, the difficulty of campaigning abroad made legislators 
hesitate to pass the OAV legislation.
72
 
 A second reason is the assumption of lawmakers that living abroad makes Filipinos 
forget their motherland. For example, opposition legislators often raised doubt with regard to 
advocates‘ intentions in pushing for absentee voting. In an interview with the Philippine Star, 
Representatives Padilla said, ―For all we know, they may not be as hot as we are here on this 
absentee voting bill‖ (PS Jan 23, 2002). In the same vein, some legislators argued that long-
time residents abroad should not be given the voting rights. Although the final version of the 
OAV law grants all overseas Filipinos including permanent residents of foreign countries 
voting rights with few strings attached, the House version of OAV law initially disallowed 
permanent residents of foreign countries to have voting rights on grounds that it was 
unconstitutional (PDI Oct 23, 2002, A3).  
Lastly, there was a prevalent perception amongst lawmakers that OAV legislation was 
neither urgent nor significant. While some legislators deliberately tried to derail the 
legislation for the first and second reason
73
, others were just not interested in the OAV 
legislation because there had been no strong lobbies before the early 2000s. For example, 
some legislators were not even aware of the fact that the 1987 Constitution mandated 
Congress to enact the OAV law.
 74
 In addition, House of Representatives members were not 
enthusiastic about the law as it did not allow absentee voting in the election of the House of 
Representatives.
75
 Representative Rosales once criticised the lack of enthusiasm in the 
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House, saying that ―the OAV was not being given the same attention‖ as other priority bills, 
due to the fact that ―district representatives would not benefit from the OAV act‖ (Mercado 
2006: 119). Another reason for the passive attitude of some legislators was their 
preoccupation with campaigning for the coming election. As discussed in the preceding 
chapter, the discussion over absentee voting in Congress always took place in the months 
leading up to the legislative elections. Senator Angara admitted that one of the reasons for the 
delay had been the preoccupation of legislators with the coming elections (Senate 2002b: 39).  
To assess the effects of OAV advocates‘ lobbying activities, let me discuss how much 
each lobbying strategy allayed the three concerns of legislators outlined above. First, the 
twelfth Congress legislators saw the indirect lobbying activities such as letter and email 
writing campaigns, text barrages, and signature campaigns as a sign that overseas Filipinos 
keenly desired the right to vote. In other words, these lobbies relieved legislators of their 
worries on the lacklustre mood of overseas Filipinos. In October 2002, when the House of 
Representatives deliberated the OAV bill, legislators acknowledged the strong desire of 
overseas Filipinos. For instance, Representative Edgar M. Chatto, with a declaration of his 
support for OAV legislation, confessed that his offices had been ―flooded with letters coming 
from OFWs‖ as well as ―personal contacts‖ (House of Representatives 2002b: 84). 
Representative Ronald B. Zamora also described the intense lobbying from OAV advocates 
as ―very effective and reasonable‖ (House of Representatives 2002b: 129). Senators‘ opinions 
were not so different. Here is a sponsorship speech from Senator Aquino-Oreta. 
Actually, Mr. President, to be very candid, I was not very impressed or I did not 
think that we should have an absentee voting … But I went with the committee to 
a hearing and I saw the fervor of our Filipino workers abroad. I saw how much 
they want to be included in choosing their leaders. (Senate of the Philippines 
2002a: 85)  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
2001: 51).   
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Apart from its role in alleviating the concerns of sceptical legislators, the indirect lobby 
campaigns were a wake-up call to indifferent legislators. By highlighting the fact that 
absentee voting was the ―constitutional‖ right and had been delayed by more than a decade, 
the letters and emails could enlighten legislators who had been ignorant of overseas Filipinos‘ 
grievances and the constitutional mandate.
76
 A statement of Representative Estrella reveals 
the pressure legislators received from the indirect lobbying strategies. He said, ―[overseas 
Filipinos] manifested their strong desire to be given this right, which is no less than our 
Constitution expressly gives them and therefore makes this task of ours all the more 
important‖ (House of Representatives 2002b: 99).  
While indirect lobbying strategies assured legislators that overseas Filipinos desired to 
participate in Philippine politics, direct lobbying activities of OAV advocates such as 
delegation visits and joining public hearings and informing the legislative processes as 
resource persons eased the primary concern of legislators, their fear of electoral fraud. 
Advocates were well aware of the fact that the main reason for the OAV law‘s delay was the 
distrust among politicians. Thus when meeting politicians they attempted to focus on assuring 
legislators that overseas Filipino NGOs would monitor and assist the election process abroad. 
The suggestions of ways assistance could be provided ranged from a provision of food to 
technical support for automated counting processes (Senate 2002c: 46-47). In terms of 
monitoring, OAV advocates in the US told president Arroyo that they were willing to ―fund a 
watchdog group … to ensure that their votes are correctly canvassed and counted in the next 
elections‖ (MB Oct 26, 2002, 1).   
The advocates‘ assurance seemed to convince politicians. When opposition legislators 
showed their concern about the possibility of fraud and blocked the legislation, supporting 
legislators persuaded them, presenting evidence of OAV advocates‘ assertion to help 
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absentee voting and the canvassing processes (Senate 2002a: 85). Even President Arroyo 
often mentioned that the government looked to overseas Filipinos for financial help when 
media reporters asked her about the problem of budget constraints on the implementation of 
absentee voting (MB Oct 26, 2002, 1; Malaya Apr 3, 2003, 2). As a result of these 
persuasions, legislators agreed to insert a provision that assured the participation of overseas 
Filipino organisations in absentee voting and canvassing processes in the OAV law (Section 
23). Legislators publicly praised the efforts of OAV advocates, saying that ―we really admire 
the enthusiasm and the determination of the Filipino organisations volunteering their service 
in watching the count as well as the election process. And we thought that is again a built-in 
safeguard against any wrongdoing‖ (Senate 2002d: 30).                                        
 All in all, the indirect and direct lobby tactics of ICOFVR members effected an 
attitude change of politicians in the legislature. These tactics provided a good rationale for 
political leaders to press opposing legislators and also provided assurance about a fair 
absentee voting process. Under the intense and united pressure from OAV advocates, 
legislators could not use the traditional excuse that only few political overseas Filipino 
groups wanted the OAV law. Moreover, the unity shown in the lobbying activities 
intimidated the legislators who used to think of overseas Filipinos as a diffused and weak 
interest group. Since legislators realized how united overseas Filipinos were, outright 
objection in open vote was a big onus on them because of their desire for re-election in the 
coming elections. For example, a staunch opponent of the OAV legislation, Senator Joker 
Arroyo, said that his colleagues in the Senate attempted to give privileges to overseas Filipino 
voters in the OAV legislative process because they were ―afraid‖ of the overseas voters (PDI 
Oct 15, 2002, A7).     
In summary, I have looked through the various lobbying activities of the ICOFVR. 
They shared a commonality in their conception and discussion in cyberspace using emails 
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and internet messenger to facilitate communication between advocates spread all over the 
world. Thanks to the development of the Internet, many overseas Filipinos could participate 
in the exerting of pressure on the government and legislature of the Philippines. The fact that 
most of OAV advocates lived outside the Philippines was both advantageous and 
disadvantageous. Hardships were mainly a lack of people who could attend and monitor the 
sessions of Congress and could appeal to congressmen about absentee voting. As outlined 
above, the lack of lobbyists partly explains why Congress had delayed OAV legislation for 
more than ten years. On the other hand, the experience of living abroad gave the advocates 
many advantages. They were better able to finance their lobby activities thanks to economic 
stability in the advanced economies where they were employed. In addition, their expatriot 
status gave them a growing collective identity. Aside from the fact that all were Filipinos 
working and living abroad, the advocates shared many experiences, memories, grievances 
and class backgrounds. The next chapter tackles the collective identity of overseas Filipinos. 
By tracing the history of labour migration policies in the Philippines, I will shed light on how 
the government shaped the grievances of overseas Filipinos and how these grievances played 












Chapter 5. GRIEVANCES 
 
In Chapter 4, I discussed the mobilizing structure of the OAV lobbying group, 
ICOFVR, and showed that its leaders deserved much of the credit for the successful OAV 
lobbying. It was their effective use of the Internet to mobilise other overseas Filipinos and 
their diverse strategies to persuade resistant politicians that provided the movement its 
momentum. However, it is also important to acknowledge the role of ordinary overseas 
Filipinos in the success. A 2002 survey reveals their desire for the right to vote at that time. 
According to the survey, 91 percent of OFW respondents supported the OAV legislation and 
84 percent said they would participate in absentee voting if they were given the voting 
rights.
77
 Given that the voting right did not give overseas Filipinos anything but a political 
voice, the enthusiasm invites a question: Why were these ordinary overseas Filipinos were so 
eager for their voting rights? The answer to this question will explain their avid participation 
in the OAV lobby campaigns.  
In this chapter, I argue that overseas Filipinos have had mounting grievances towards 
the Philippine government‘s overseas employment policies. Their grievances stemmed from 
government‘s policy dissonance. On one hand, the government has long praised OFWs as 
―Bagong Bayani (New Heroes)‖ or ―Modern-day Heroes‖ who saved the country from its 
severe economic plight. It is necessary to highlight here the significance of the term ―heroes‖, 
a word that has invoked high expectations among OFWs because of the Filipino fetish for 
―National Heroes‖ who sacrificed their lives for the country. On the other hand, since the 
mid-1990s, the government has relaxed its control over the labour migration industry by 
introducing deregulation measures and this deregulatory stand caused the unfettered 
proliferation of private recruitment agencies and ensuing public outcry among OFWs because 
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Zealand, Sweden, and Indonesia (PS, Dec 13, 2002) 
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of increasing illegal recruitment cases. Based on these findings, I will conclude that the 
government‘s failure to match its words with deeds sparked a groundswell of anger among 
OFWs. The fact that the government did not guarantee basic rights such as the voting rights 
for the ―New Heroes‖ exacerbated their frustration still further.        
The next section will examine how the Philippine government has raised expectations 
of OFWs by making them New Heroes and then unravel why the government policy has 
deepened the grievances of OFWs. 
 
The making of New Heroes 
 
It was during the Marcos era that the Philippine government started to call OFWs 
―heroes‖. From Marcos‘ ascent to power in 1965, the government promoted labour migration 
as a way of addressing some domestic problems. Faced with the drastic increase in crude-oil 
price and political instability under the 1972 martial law, Marcos pushed as many Filipinos as 
possible outside the Philippines.
78
 By issuing the Labor Code in 1974, the government 
created the Overseas Employment Development Board and the National Seamen Board to 
promote the flows of international migration. To justify the labour migration policy, the 
authoritarian government described OFWs‘ toiling work in foreign countries as ―sacrifice‖ 
for the country‘s economic development (Tyner 2004: 31; Timberman 1991: 91). As part of 
the policy, in 1984, the government launched the Bagong Bayani Awards (New Heroes 
Awards) to recognise the OFWs‘ contribution to the country‘s economic situation (POEA 
1983).  
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 The number of OFWs in 1972 marked a 671.1 percent increase compared with the previous year (Gonzalez 
1998: 32). For political reason, more than a million Filipinos, most of whom were of an educated middle class, 
left Philippines for good during the 1970s and 1980s (Anderson 1988: 20).  
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After the democratisation in 1986, it was easier for disgruntled OFWs to appeal to the 
government and media. According to the POEA, the number of welfare cases filed in 1987 
had increased almost sevenfold from that of 1982 (See Table 1, page 3). To make matters 
worse, in the 1980s onwards, the increasing number of abuse and suicide cases of OFWs, 
especially female workers, began to be widely publicised through the media. In return, the 
government took concrete steps for the making of ‗New Heroes‘. To alleviate the eruption of 
OFW complaints, the government had no choice but to inherit the Marcos regime‘s policy 
emphasising the sacrifice of OFWs.
79
 The government continued to call on OFWs to be 
patient by calling them ―heroes‖. Aquino praised OFWs as ‗unsung heroes‘ (PDI, Jun 24, 
1990, 4) and ‗modern day heroes‘ (Palma-Beltran and Dios 1992: 94), Ramos described them 
as ‗heroic overseas workers‘ (Lobo 1998: 199), Estrada emphasized self-sacrifice of 
‗modern-day heroes‘ (MB, Mar 1, 2000, 1) and Arroyo hailed them as ‗new heroes‘ (PDI, Jun 
8, 2001, A4).  
The government also enacted laws and regulations for OFWs to support the discursive 
making of New Heroes. Aquino signed two proclamations, No 91 and No 276, which 
heralded the ―Overseas Filipino Contract Workers‘ Week‖ and ―Month of Overseas Filipinos‖ 
in 1987 and 1988 respectively. The Ramos administration also proclaimed June 7 the 
―Migrant Workers day‖ to celebrate the passage of a landmark law for the OFWs: the Migrant 
Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995 (Republic Act 8042). Most recently, Estrada 
declared year 2000 as the ―Year of the OFW‖ (Proclamation No.243). During these days, 
official ceremonies are held with a variety of activities, such as free legal and medical 
services and distribution of free gifts.
80
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 After Marcos fled the country, the Philippine economy remained dire because of the drastic increase of 
average unemployment rate and balance of trade (Department of Labor and Employment 2004, National 
Statistics Office 2004). Therefore Aquino and her successors in the post-Marcos regimes continued to see labour 
migration policy as a stop-gap measure for the ailing economy (Tyner 2004: 38-40). 
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In addition to the regulations, it is easy to observe the government‘s effort in everyday 
life, too. Among many places in the Philippines, the arrival hall of the Ninoy Aquino 
International Airport (NAIA) in Manila deserves attention as this is where most returning 
OFWs go through. Once they get off airplanes, OFWs encounter exclusive express counters 
for OFWs in customs and immigration lanes to process them without any hassle. These 
express counters have been operational since 1998. If their arrival day is around the 
Christmas holiday, they may even meet the president of the country and receive gift packages 
and grand welcome ceremonies on a red carpet, listening to Christmas carols and fanfare. 
This grand welcoming ceremony started in 1993. An overseas Filipino worker described the 
―heroes‘ greetings‖ in the airport as ―the happiest part of the OCWs‘ life and that of their 
families‖ (TF Jan 1994: 17).  
From the long history of the making of New Heroes, it is noteworthy that the 
government uses the adjective ―new‖ to indicate heroic deeds of OFWs. It reflects the fact 
that there were existing heroes in Philippine history. To find out what these existing ―heroes‖ 
mean in the context of Philippine history will help us better understand the government‘s 
underlying intentions when praising OFWs as New Heroes. Thus let me briefly identify the 
existing heroes in the Philippines and explain Filipinos‘ peculiar enthrallment with the word 
―heroes‖.  
In the Philippines, ―heroes‖ usually refers to ―Philippine National Heroes‖ who 
sacrificed their lives for the nation-building of the Philippines at various moments of its 
history. National Heroes are so popular in the Philippines that there are floods of books 
introducing their lives and efforts to compile lists of them (McCoy 2000; De Guzman 
1967).
81
 Even the government formed the National Heroes Committee to set criteria for 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
free medicines, low priced commodities and legal assistance in the 1998 Migrant Workers‘ Day (POEA 1998: 
18).  
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 As a sign of their popularity, Benedict Anderson points to the ―Rizalista‖ in the Philippines, a group of people 
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judging those entitled to the status of National Hero and select publicly recognised National 
Heroes (House of Representatives 2003). This enthusiasm for heroes is not a recent 
phenomenon. Since the 16th century under the Spanish colonial rule, when European 
missionaries brought books on Saint‘s life, ―hagiographic biography‖ has been the 
―omnipresent‖ feature of Philippine biography (McCoy 2000: 4-5). As the country 
experienced a wave of anti-colonial movements in the late 19th century, Philippine history 
saw a burgeoning of nationalism among some educated Filipinos who fought for the 
independence of the Philippines. While the US colonial government initiated the practice of 
representing these Filipinos as National Heroes
82
, the independent Philippines since 1946 has 
accelerated in commemorating the lives of National Heroes, such as Jose Rizal and Andreas 
Bonifacio. As a consequence of it, in 1956, the Philippine government enacted the Republic 
act 1425, known as the ―Rizal Law‖ which mandated all schools in the Philippines to teach 
Rizal‘s life, literary works and writings. In addition, the government declared tens of holidays 
naming after these National Heroes (House of Representatives 2003: 4-6).  
As with other nation-states, the Philippine government‘s desire when reminding 
Filipinos of the National Heroes‘ sacrifice was to tap into Filipinos‘ enthusiasm to develop 
the country. The 1993 National Heroes Day speech by President Ramos attests to the 
underlying intention of the government. In the speech, Ramos says the Philippines, a country 
―created by heroes‖, is faced with the tyranny of poverty, a different tyrant from that 
Philippine‘s National Heroes used to struggle against. He urges Filipinos to be ―living 
heroes‖ who ―will not die for their country but will live for it‖ (MT Aug 30, 1993). Nine 
years later, President Arroyo delivered the same call for Filipinos to do their share in nation-
                                                                                                                                                                                    
who believe that one of National Heroes, Jose Rizal, is the Filipino Christ and await his return (Anderson 1998: 
50).  
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 Carl Crow (1914: 53-55) notes that the US colonial government made its effort to select Filipino heroes and 




building. On the country‘s 104th Independence Day in 2002, Arroyo said ―everyone could be 
heroes‖ to fight the two major challenges of the country: terrorism and poverty (PDI Jun 13, 
2002, 1).  
The government‘s call to be a living hero seems to be successfully embedded in the 
minds of Filipinos. In the daily lives of Filipinos, the word ―hero‖ becomes a byword thanks 
to its enthusiastic usage by the press and civil society groups as well as the government.
83
 As 
a result of these combined efforts, contemporary Philippine history has seen scores of 
National Heroes at its cornerstones. For instance, the 1986 People Power Revolution 
originated from the ―sacrificial‖ death of Benigno ―Ninoy‖ Aquino, the arch rival of 
Marcos.
84
 His martyr-like death incorporated Filipinos from all walks of life and helped the 
opposition hitherto fragile to transform into a united front. Another good example is Estrada‘s 
rise to power in the 1998 presidential election. In this election, the former movie star-turned 
politician won by a landslide victory not so much because of the traditional oligarchic elite‘s 
support but thanks to his image as a champion of the masses. Owing in large part to his 
appearances as ―a golden-hearted tough-guy in hard-action movies where he tangled with 
drug lords, corrupt politicians and organized criminals‖ (Crisostomo 1999: 89). His hero 
image appealed to the masses by giving the majority of poor Filipinos a hope that Estrada 
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 The Philippine media seem keen to promote the hero spirit among Filipinos. It is not unusual to see ordinary 
Filipinos dubbed as ―heroes‖ by the press. If anyone sacrifices himself for other people, Philippine newspapers 
are not reluctant to call them heroes (e.g., airplane passengers (PDI Mar 1, 2000, 5), firemen (PDI Feb 8, 2001, 
A8), forest rangers (PDI Jun 11, 1996, 1), a policeman (PDI May 3, 2001, A1) and even foreigners (PDI Oct 22, 
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NGO leader who initiates ―The Galing Pilipino Movement (The Excellent Filipino Movement)‖ says, 
―[m]akabayan (patriotic) is an inherent Pilipino character that places interest of country above self for the 
common good. Makabayani (heroic) is a unique Pilipino trait of going that extra mile in doing a good deed in 
order to serve others without expecting material gains. Thus, one cannot be a makabayan without being a 
makabayani and vice versa‖ (PDI Aug 28, 2005, A4-1).  
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 On August 21, 1983, Aquino was shot dead at the Manila International Airport upon returning home from 
self-exile in the United States. Many Filipinos perceived his death as martyrdom comparable to that of Jose 
Rizal, the country‘s prime National Hero. Just as Rizal returned to the Philippines from Europe to organise a 
anti-colonial movement against the Spanish colonial rule and finally was executed by the colonial government, 
Aquino also insisted to return home, knowing that he would be likely to be killed by the Marcos authoritarian 
government (Villadolid 2007: 78).  
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could save them out of poverty as he did in the movies (Hutchcroft and Rocamora 2003: 
280).  
The special status of National Heroes in Philippine history reveals two implications 
when examining the making of New Heroes. First, the Philippine government has historically 
made efforts to incorporate the spirit of National Heroes with the sense of nationalism so that 
it can draw unconditional support from its citizens. The same goes for the making of New 
Heroes. When extolling OFWs as New Heroes, the government is well aware that the 
contribution of OFWs to the Philippine economy is considerable, thus their welfare 
complaints to the government are not negligible. For the government, which oftentimes 
admits its incapacity to alleviate the plight of overseas Filipino workers in host countries
85
, it 
is better to praise OFWs as heroes than to just recognize them as Philippine citizens. Calling 
OFWs heroes is an easy choice for the government because, given the lives of National 
Heroes, heroes are supposed to either overcome difficulties or remain as martyrs without 
asking for any help.  
Second, the spirit of National Heroes has played a role in shaping the political 
behaviour of Filipinos in Philippine political history. National Heroes are an exemplary 
figure to the Filipinos. This means OFWs as Philippine citizens also have reverenced for 
National Heroes and know what it means to be heroes in the Philippines. It is a high place of 
honour and guiding value for Filipinos. Therefore, when the government dubs them New 
Heroes, OFWs know how much honour they are to receive from the government and the rest 
of the Filipinos. In other words, the status of New Heroes gives OFWs high expectations 
equivalent to what the government did for the National Heroes.   
Indeed, OFWs have good reason to identify themselves with National Heroes. First of 
all, there is a shared experience of living overseas. Just as many National Heroes had 
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take an assertive action over the mauling of a Filipino diplomat in Saudi Arabia (PDI Nov 2, 1994, 1).  
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travelled abroad before they came back to the Philippines
86
, Underemployment and 
governmental labour migration policies forced many OFWs to leave for the developed 
economies. Another similarity lies in the fact that both sets of people have martyr-like 
personal stories. Since the early 1990s, the Philippine media has consistently dealt with OFW 
victims of abuse and illegal recruitment, and their death in foreign countries (De Guzman 
2003). Particularly their deaths often sparked a series of public outcry in the Philippines due 
to controversy over injustice to OFW victims (PDI Sep 18, 1995, 8; PDI Jan 14, 1996, 12). 
For OFWs, their plight is comparable to the martyrdom of National Heroes
87
, given that 
many OFWs also intend to work abroad for others (e.g., their families or the state‘s ailing 
economy), not themselves.   
As a result of these similarities, OFWs often discuss whether they can be considered 
National Heroes. A quick look at an OFW magazine published in Hong Kong, Tinig Filipino 
(TF), provides evidence of this. For instance, one article titled ―We Are Heroes, Too!‖ 
proudly proclaims that OFWs to be economic heroes tantamount to the National Heroes of 
the past (TF Dec 1999: 82).  
Among the Filipino heroes, Dr. Jose Rizal is a stand-out. Thus he was chosen as 
our national hero. … However, in the early 80‘s, there emerged a new kind of 
hero – Filipino style. The Economic Heroes.  
At the end of the article, however, it raised a grim question. 
Yes, we the migrants, the so-called Economic Heroes of our country have done a 
lot to alleviate our country‘s economy. But has our government done much to 
improve our lot? The answer lies on your hands.  
Tinig Filipino regularly features articles on this issue. Some articles juxtapose the lives of 
National Heroes with those of OFWs. For example, the long time Jose Rizal spent travelling 
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 The most revered National Hero, Jose Rizal had to leave the Philippines under the Spanish colonial rule 
because his family was embroiled in a political conflict (Anderson 1998: 229). From 1882, he spent five years in 
Europe. Another National Hero, Benigno Aquino chose self-exile in America for three years to combat the 
Marcos dictatorship.    
87
 Jose Rizal faced a ―Christ-like death‖ when he was killed by a firing squad and Jose Burgos, the first Filipino 
priest under the Spanish rule, was executed by garrotte and Benigno Aquino was shot to death at the Manila 
International Airport (Ileto 1998: 62-78; Anderson 1998: 228).   
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abroad is compared to the experiences of ―modern-day Filipino pilgrims, the OCWs 
[Overseas Contract Workers, another term referring to OFWs]‖ (TF Dec 1994: 66). Some 
have argued that ―the first Filipino saint, San Lorenzo Ruiz de Manila was a migrant worker‖, 
and de Manila is certainly a figure many OFWs feel a strong affinity with (TF Jan 1995: 26). 
Although some raise a question of whether the overseas Filipino worker should be considered 
―a martyr or a hero‖ and do not think of themselves as equal as National Heroes, almost all 
agree that the life of OFWs deserves to be called martyrdom (TF Nov 1992: 39; TF Nov 
1995: 20). Based on such pride, OFWs encourage one another by proclaiming themselves to 
be ―present-day heroes‖, ―real and living heroes‖, and ―dignified economic heroes‖, (TF Jul 
1993: 4; TF Nov 1996: 36; TF Jun 1997: 53). All these articles demonstrate that OFWs 
identify themselves with the tragic lives of National Heroes.   
All in all, the fact that OFWs see themselves as a reflection of the traditional National 
Heroes has helped the Philippine government earn more remittances from them. The 
identification with such status gives OFWs pride and energy despite their toiling work 
abroad. At the same time, however, it plays a critical role in frustrating OFWs to a greater 
degree than other disgruntled local Filipinos on the grounds that the government should treat 
New ―Heroes‖ appropriately. The following section examines how the Philippine government 
has frustrated OFWs, thereby deepening their grievances. I then argue that the deepened 
grievances erupted into the ferocious lobby for the OAV law in the early 2000s.        
 
Modern-day heroes or modern-day slaves?  
 
The treatment of OFWs as National Heroes has now been revealed as an illusion. The 
Philippine government has been unable to (or not willing to) protect OFWs since it initiated 
labour migration in the 1970s. A reason for this apparent neglect is the movement of OFWs 
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across national borders. The transnational movement generates sovereignty problems such as 
the rule of non-intervention in the international community (Ball and Piper 2002: 1018). In 
the case of the Philippines, due to its weak status in the capitalist global economy, the 
government has had difficulty settling abuse cases of involving OFWs in destination 
countries (Tyner 2004: 80). In addition, the government has no comprehensive program to 
address OFWs plight. The Philippine government since Marcos has viewed the overseas 
employment programs as a ―temporary solution‖ to address the country‘s unemployment and 
balance of payment problems (Alegado 1997: 27). Although post-Marcos governments have 
made greater efforts to ensure the rights and welfare of Filipino migrant workers, they have 
still not been able to respond to problems systematically and efficiently (Asis 1992: 74; 
Samonte et al 1995: 26). In other words, the Philippine state addresses ―issues and problems 
as they arise‖ without having far-sighted solutions (Samonte et al 1995: 26).  
However, the explanations above are not enough to understand the deep-seated 
grievances of OFWs. The underlying reason for the grievances, I argue, is the dual attitude of 
the Philippine government towards OFWs. While the government continues to carry out 
policies praising migrant workers, it attempts to deregulate labour migration policy and 
constantly declares that it does not intend to intervene in individual matters between overseas 
employment agencies and their worker. The government looks to do all it can to avoid any 
responsibility for acting as a protector of OFWs. In the following paragraphs, I will specify 
this policy dissonance.     
Jorge Tigno (2004: 8-11) notes that the history of overseas employment policy is 
largely one of ―deregulation‖, indicating the government‘s inability to process OFWs because 
of a drastic surge of OFWs since the 1970s. Despite its intermittent efforts to regulate 
―overcrowded‖ private overseas employment agencies, the government normally concedes to 
the persistence of the private agencies. After ―de facto‖ and ―ad hoc‖ deregulation strategies 
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on the labour migration programme in the 1970s and 80s, the Philippine government under 
President Ramos (1992-1998) finally fleshed out its ―de jure‖ deregulation stance (Tigno 
2004: 11). A good example of the deregulation policy under Ramos is evident in the passage 
of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995 (RA 8042), which overhauls the 
Philippines‘ overseas employment programme. For the first time, the law stipulates that 
labour migration is ―strictly a matter between the worker and his foreign employer‖ (Section 
29) and confines the role of government to providing ―local employment opportunities‖, not 
overseas employment (Section 2c).  
The reason behind the introduction of the deregulation clauses in RA 8042 is the 
government‘s long-standing view that the overseas employment programme is only 
―temporary‖ measure for the ailing economy of the Philippines. The statements of Senator 
Herrera and Maceda in a meeting of the Bicameral Conference Committee best show the 
government‘s perception. The senators concluded economic development was a better 
solution than tight regulations to problems that had arisen as a result of the overseas 
employment policy (Tigno 2004: 17). Some legislators agreed with them, saying that tough 
regulations had encouraged the proliferation of illegal migrant workers.
88
   
Since the RA 8042 legislation, the Philippine government has aggressively embraced 
deregulation policies in the overseas employment industry. To support its subsequent moves, 
the government insists that the scale of international labour migration has increasingly 
surpassed government capacity to manage the flows. A good example of this is a White Paper 
published by the POEA. It notes, 
The economic law of supply and demand is an irrepressible force in the global 
labour market, [more so] now with the globalization era. Unfortunately, this 
reality seems overshadowed by the application of national labour laws and 
administrative systems that perpetuate a pathological fallacy that labour migration 
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is a program creation or innovation of government to address employment gaps. 
(Casco 1997: 2-3, as quoted in Tyner 2004: 44) 
 
By proclaiming it inappropriate to attempt to control international labour migration, the 
government positions itself as a facilitator of natural flows, not a protector of OFWs.  
In assessing the series of deregulation policies, however, academia and civil society 
groups argue that the deregulation clauses undermined the goal of the Migrant Workers and 
Overseas Filipino Act: the protection and promotion of welfare of OFWs. Nuqui and Josue 
(2000: 41) note that ―not much significant change has transpired since the law passed‖ and 
the Philippine Migrants Rights Watch sees the deregulation policy in RA 8042 as ―a clever 
way for government to abdicate its responsibility and role in labor migration while at the 
same time continuing to profit from it‖ (Philippine Migrants Rights Watch 1995: 83-4). In 
their analysis of the role of the Philippine state in labour exportation, Ball and Piper (2002: 
1023) also argue that the government policy undermines the protective function of 
government because, according to the logic of this policy, ―abused women are therefore 
considered to be willing participants in overseas migration through free and rational choices, 
with accountability for cases of exploitation being transferred to the migrants‖.89         
As a result of the deregulatory drive, OFWs‘ complaints over the illegal recruitment 
issue have been gradually on the rise. As Table 5 reveals, with the exception of the period 
from 1998 to 2000, the number of illegal recruitment cases has been rising since 1995 when 
the government initiated the ―de jure‖ deregulation drive in the overseas employment 
industry. Particularly noticeable is the drastic surge in the number of cases since 2001. 
Considering the fact that illegal recruitment cases usually involve a number of OFW victims, 
it is deemed that the grievances of OFWs are deepened in accordance with the surge.
90
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Table 5. Illegal recruitment cases, 1995-2003 










     Source: POEA Annual Report 
 
With the grievances of OFWs deepening due to the deregulation policies since the mid-
1990s, the government praise of OFWs as New Heroes began to sound increasingly false. 
Although the state made it clear that working abroad was no longer a sacrifice for the 
country, all the Philippine presidents since 1995 have had repeatedly used the hero discourse 
every time they have mentioned OFWs (Lobo 1998: 199; MB Mar 1, 2000: 1; PDI Jun 8, 
2001, A4). Apart from the lip services of the president, the government has maintained rules 
and regulations enacted in recognition of OFWs‘ heroic deeds for the country. For instance, 
since 1984, the Bagong Bayani Awards have been conferred on OFWs whose heroic deeds 
contributed to national development. Every year, a non-profit institution, the Bagong Bayani 
Foundation Inc. selects OFW awardees and holds official awarding ceremonies. In the wake 
of the Asian crisis in 1998, the government also introduced exclusive customs and 
immigration lanes for OFWs returning to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and 
increased its efforts to welcome returning OFWs in other ways with various events held at the 
airport. 
In summary, I have so far looked into how Philippine governments since 1995 have 
attempted to make a discursive turn in labour migration policy. By declaring working abroad 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
more the number of illegal recruitment cases in the same year (POEA 2004: 17). 
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to be a realization of self-fulfilment, the government has denied its hitherto promotion of the 
labour migration policy and disclaimed responsibility for the plight of OFWs. How then did 
OFWs react to the government‘s dual policy in the overseas employment industry? An 
examination of their responses will reveal how much the Philippine government policy has 
created grievances amongst OFWs. In the rest of the chapter, I will examine desperate 
responses of overseas workers and highlight a common source of grievance: a frustration 
over being called heroes.   
A good starting point for the investigation is an examination of OFWs‘ responses to the 
exploitation and abuse of Filipino migrant workers in 1994 and 1995. During these two years, 
the Philippine media reported more deaths and abuses of OFWs than ever before.
91
 In the 
wake of these outpouring reports, OFWs levelled criticism at the government‘s incapacity to 
deal with these accidents. An issue of particular criticism was the government‘s response to 
the execution of a Filipina domestic helper, Flor Contemplacion by the Singapore judiciary in 
1995. When the government could not take any concrete action on the controversial hanging, 
an OFW expressed his dismay by asking the government to treat OFWs as ―human beings‖, 
not as ―heroes‖ (PDI Mar 19, 1995, 10). His statement implies that the government dashed 
his expectation of being treated as a hero and in fact treated OFWs not even as human beings. 
Another OFW in Saudi Arabia lamented the increasing number of abuses and deaths of 
Filipino workers in 1994 and mocked the empty label ―modern-day heroes‖ suggesting 
instead the term ―modern day slaves‖ (PDI Dec 31, 1994, 4). Not only calling themselves the 
sarcastic term ―modern day slaves‖, other OFWs also mock the empty label ―New Heroes‖ 
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 A government official said ―[n]o other year saw [such] a profusion of abuse of Filipino overseas contract 
workers than[as] 1994‖ (PDI Dec 31, 1994, 4). The media reports on OFW accidents are the following: the 
cases of Filipino maids being abused by their bosses in Hong Kong (PDI Aug 11, 1994, 8) and Taiwan (PDI 
Aug 21, 1994, 4); the physical abuse of OFWs in Nothern Marianas Islands (PDI, Oct 2, 1994, 1) and Saudi 
Arabia (PDI Oct 7, 1994, 1); excessive fees charged by private recruitment agencies (PDI Jul 18, 1994, 5); the 
Malaysian government‘s crackdown on OFWs (PDI Oct 28, 1994, 3); the spat with Singapore over the ban on 
sending Filipino maids to Singapore (PDI Nov 1, 1994, 1); the execution of a Filipina maid in Singapore (PDI 
Mar 1, 1994, 1); the death sentence for a Filipina maid in UAE (PDI Sep 17, 1995, 22). 
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by coining words such as ―mga bayaning uto-uto‖92 (gullible heroes), ―bagong biktima ng 
hold-up‖93 (new hold-up victims) .  
After 1995, despite the government‘s moves to relieve itself of responsibility for 
OFWs‘ adversity, OFWs still saw themselves as heroes being mistreated by the government. 
Consider an article of Tinig Filipino published in 1996. In the article titled ―Neglected 
Heroes‖, an OFW in Saudi Arabia notes, 
But does our government wonder why we are in foreign lands? … This is because 
our government cannot afford to give us all a job and better earning. 
They call us economic heroes. We, the migrant workers are the new hope of our 
country for a better tomorrow. We are their best market today so they must 
protect us and give us good services whenever we go home. (TF Mar 1996, 26)     
From this article, we can see that OFWs‘ perception of labour migration changed little after 
1995. Despite the government‘s policy shift of a year before, OFWs still thought that they 
had to work abroad because the government did not provide any decent jobs. Moreover, they 
maintained a high expectation of ―good services‖ from the government and this reveals that 
the government did not give up in imbuing the New Hero discourse into OFWs. The same 
goes for the articles published in the following years. OFWs continued to lament their 
hardships using the terms like ―degraded economic heroes‖ (TF Aug 1997, 52) and ―unsung 
heroes‖ (PDI Jun 13, 2001) 
With these grievances running high in the late 1990s and the early 2000s, some OFWs 
began to organise lobby campaigns for the OAV legislation. As shown in Chapter 4, it was 
also around this time that the ICOFVR took its shape thanks to the OAV advocates. OAV 
advocates invoked the increasing grievances felt amongst OFWs to mobilise them as a 
campaign group. They adopted several strategies to enlist support from OFWs. Among them 
were ―networking with OFW organisations‖ and ―using the Internet to inform and enlist 
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support‖.94 In both strategies, OAV advocates highlighted the contrast between what OFWs 
contributed to the country and what the country did in return for these OFWs. With regards to 
the first tactic, an overseas Filipino organisation leader Cynthia Abdon-Tellez demonstrates 
how her organisation enlisted support from ordinary OFWs.
95
 She acknowledged that the 
Mission For Migrant Workers (MFMW) in Hong Kong made concerted efforts to inform 
OFWs about what made them work abroad. 
We have a basic training module on Philippine migration laws and that would 
include a history of how this came about, what are situations in the Philippines 
and why they firstly came over here… We are saying that here is situation, it‘s 
not your decision and you were forced to make this decision. Or at least, (we tell 
them) they made a bad choice in a very bad situation. Very limited situation. 
(Interview with Cynthia Abdon-Tellez) 
 
She also said that OFWs in the MFMW call themselves ―new milking cows‖ as part of 
mocking the term New Heroes. Her remarks reveal that OAV advocates focused on 
reminding OFWs of their unfair treatment by the Philippine government.  
I found the same mobilisation strategy on the Internet. To raise awareness among other 
Filipinos about absentee voting, the OAV advocates used several websites such as ―Pinoy 
Exchange‖ and ―Philippine Update.com‖.96 In these websites, the OAV advocates shared 
information, updated news on the OAV issue and had debates over the OAV legislation. A 
press statement uploaded to the websites provides a good example. One of the ICOFVR 
member organisations, the ―Global Coalition for the Political Empowerment of Overseas 
Filipinos‖ issued the statement to enlist support from OFWs as well as to appeal to the 
government for the OAV legislation. 
Our role as economic saviors or, according to the government, as "modern-day 
heroes" should be enough reason to entitle us to political rights as basic as 
suffrage. But we are not asserting our right to vote only in the context of our 




 Interview by the author (Apr 28, 2008) 
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economic value and as a matter of political quid pro quo. Beneath the simmer of 
our resentment is a raging desire to be recognized and treated as full-fledged 
Filipino citizens, not as an apolitical constituency easily made giddy by 
patronizing labels and by the welcome-home-modern-day-hero drama at NAIA 
[Ninoy Aquino International Airport]. (Global Coalition 2001) 
 
The statement stirs up OFWs‘ feelings against the Philippine government by using succinct 
expressions, such as the sharp contrast between the worship of ―modern-day heroes‖ and the 
actual treatment of OFWs by the government. As an example of the description of their 
grievances, the statement draws on the government-sponsored welcome events for OFWs at 
the international airport.
97
 Indeed, the welcome events are more than a plain example; these 
are the campaigner‘s best catalyst when reminding OFWs of their grievances against the 
government as it is the arrival hall of NAIA that most OFWs often receive the hero‘s 
welcome and ill-treatment at the same time.
98
 Because of these contradicting experiences, 
this statement strikes a special chord with OFWs.  
As a result of the success of OAV advocates‘ efforts to invoke the grievances of 
overseas workers, the campaign for absentee voting was able to enlist a groundswell of 
support from ordinary OFWs. As articulated in Chapter 4, they participated in signature 
campaigns, letter-writing campaigns, and texting messages to Philippine legislators. As 
testimony to their motivation, I refer to the many voices of OFWs I encountered in interviews, 
magazines and newspapers. One of my interviewees, Erma C. Geolamin is a Filipina 
domestic maid in Hong Kong and strong supporter of the OAV legislation.
99
 She worked for 
her boss on weekdays and worked for the cause on weekends. When asked why she was so 
enthusiastic about the voting rights, she responded that it was because of her ―patriotism‖. In 
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 In this annual event for OFWs returning for the Christmas and New Year holidays, the president leads the red 
carpet welcome, food distribution and the singing of Christmas carol songs. As for the details, see Government 
of Philippines News Dec 18, 2006 (http://www.gov.ph/news/default.asp?i=16780).   
98
 Whereas the OFW customs lanes and the welcome events delight OFWs, a constant series of nuisances also 
take place in their arrival in the airport: chronic bribe requests by corrupt immigration and customs officials; 
price-gouging by taxi drivers and other NAIA workers and so on (Gutierrez 2007: 387). For example, a Filipina 
worker says her ―unexplained joy‖ turned into a ―nightmare‖ when she encountered such nuisances (TF Sep 
1993, 25).    
99
 Interview by the author (Apr 24, 2008). 
83 
 
fact, the college graduate maid was well aware of the origin of her bitterness. She had sent 
remittances to the Philippines for the last 20 years. The government as well as her family had 
benefited from the remittances, but she received ―nothing in return‖ from the government. It 
was the feeling that she had been unfairly treated that led to her to joining the OAV 
campaigns.  
A former OFW, Eduardo Laxamana, shows the same grievances as Geolamin. In an op-
ed of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, Laxamana begins his article by asking, ―[h]ave you 
worked in a construction site in Iraq with the whole country enveloped by war clouds?‖ 
Although he admits that his toiling work abroad was ―more for [his] family and less for the 
country‖, he is adamant that, ―I have bank records to prove that in my own small way I 
helped bail out the country during times of dollar scarcity‖. Thus he thinks those who block 
the introduction of absentee voting ―extremely cruel‖ because the voting right is ―a basic 
right and it has been denied to people who are called ―modern-day heroes‖‖ (PDI Oct 30, 
2002, A10). In his appeal, there is a strong recognition of the contrast between the toiling 
work of the so-called ―modern-day heroes‖ and the ―extremely cruel‖ treatment by the 
Philippine government.   
From the voice of another overseas Filipino, I find a sentiment that OFWs see 
themselves as a follower of National Heroes. Christopher Opstal is a Filipino student in 
Australia. When Congress passed the OAV legislation in 2003, he expressed his excitement 
by saying that, ―I am answering the call of our national hero, Dr. Jose Rizal, to be the fair 
hope of our Inang Bayan [motherland]‖ (Carino 2007: 132). Underlying his statement is the 
respect for National Heroes and the pride that as an overseas Filipino he was conducting a 
heroic deed as Rizal instructed.  
In sum, the voices of OFWs reveal that there is a common tendency among them: a 
recognition of the sharp contrast between their own plight and the high praise of ―New 
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Heroes‖ made by the Philippine government. The recognition turned into bitterness when the 
dual policy of the government culminated in the late 1990s. Therefore, for the OFWs who 
participated in the OAV campaigns, the empty label ―New Heroes‖ was not just an object at 

























Chapter 6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
The long standing fight of overseas Filipinos for their voting rights ended with the 
successful passage of the OAV act in 2003. All the overseas Filipinos I met for interviews 
were thrilled that they established a cornerstone in the history of overseas Filipino activism. 
Their ardent lobbying efforts deserve to receive much of the credit for the passage, but this 
study concludes that there are other factors that along with their lobby activities made a 
contribution to the success. In the last chapter of this study, I will first summarise findings 
from the analyses of empirical chapters, respectively political opportunities, mobilizing 
structure and grievances and will discuss some implications of the study.  
 
Findings of the study 
 
In explaining the passage of the OAV act in 2003, this study supposes that the passage 
is the mixed result of external and internal elements. These elements have been presented in 
chapters 3, 4 and 5. The external elements are presidential support in the mid-term legislative 
elections, the emergence of progressive party-list groups such as Akbayan in the House since 
1998, the Asian crisis, and the advent of the Internet in the late 1990s. All these external 
elements analysed in Chapter 3 contributed to the favourable environment in which OAV 
advocates conducted their lobby campaigns in the early 2000s. Each of the elements may 
have little weight in itself. However, when these converged into the backdrop of the twelfth 
Congress, they brought about a change of legislators‘ attitude.  
The election cycle of the post-Marcos Philippines provides the president with a cyclical 
opportunity to gain momentum to push for political reform: the years leading up to the mid-
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term legislative elections. In this period, presidents‘ drive for reform becomes intense so as to 
lay a good groundwork for the rest of their term. Overseas Filipinos‘ most aggressive 
campaigns for the voting right took place in these periods and therefore they were able to 
gain support from President Arroyo. Moreover, the personal motivation of Arroyo for re-
election played a critical role in her lavish support for the introduction of absentee voting in 
the 2004 presidential and legislative elections. No previous presidents had had a chance to 
seek re-election and Arroyo‘s ambitions for re-election must have given her a strong reason 
to support the cause of OAV advocates.  
While President Arroyo pressed Congress from outside, a sectoral party Akbayan 
worked for overseas Filipinos‘ voting rights inside the House of Representatives. Although 
Akbayan‘s numerical presence in the House was marginal, Akbayan lawmakers were 
committed to building a bridge between legislators and OAV advocates. Particularly 
Representative Rosales made effective use of her background as a political activist and her 
status in the House as a committee chairperson.   
On the economic front, the Asian crisis of 1997 exacerbated problems with the 
Philippine economy, but emboldened overseas Filipinos, elevating their confidence. In the 
wake of the crisis, in the early 2000s, government‘s reliance on the remittances of overseas 
Filipinos grew drastically. As the role of overseas Filipinos in propping up the country‘s 
ailing economy became clear and they were increasingly referred to as heroes, the crisis 
provided an effective weapon to fight for their voting rights. For those who believed 
themselves as heroes, the deprivation of basic rights was not acceptable.  
Chapter 4 looked into internal elements by emphasising the role of related actors. It 
examined how OAV advocates and politicians adopted their action under given opportunities. 
The advocates found the twelfth Congress (2001-2004) suitable for them to achieve their 
goals. The use of the Internet to link the advocates together created a new way of lobby 
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campaigns. They launched the international network of overseas Filipinos, the ICOFVR, and 
made all-out efforts to press Congress and government for the OAV law. The ICOFVR was a 
fluid coalition that has neither office nor strict membership. Any individuals and groups were 
able to be a member of the organisation. Unlike previous advocacy groups for overseas 
Filipinos‘ voting rights in the 1990s, the ICOFVR was a truly world-wide organisation in 
terms of its membership. Aside from its description of the ICOFVR, Chapter 4 also looks into 
its various repertoires and assesses how much impact it made on the legislators who passed 
the OAV law in 2003. Among the tactics were letter and email writing, delegation visits, text 
barrages and appeals to the media. It is estimated that the lobby campaigns significantly 
alleviated the concerns of legislators, shifting attitudes towards the introduction of absentee 
voting. By showing their strong intention to monitor absentee voting and the canvassing 
processes, ICOFVR members were successful in convincing lawmakers who had worried 
about the possibility of overseas votes being tampered with in favour of ruling party 
candidates. Their collective action also quickened the pace of the OAV legislation‘s progress 
through a Congress that had hitherto been filled with indifferent legislators. Thanks to the 
manner in which lobby campaigns were conducted, legislators in the twelfth Congress could 
not ignore the extent to which overseas Filipinos wanted the right to vote.    
Another internal element of the successful lobbying was the increasing sense of 
grievance felt by overseas Filipinos towards the Philippine government. Chapter 5 traced 
back to a growing chasm between the high expectation of overseas Filipinos and the grim 
reality of the treatment. I found that the grievances of overseas Filipinos deepened after the 
1990s. The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 exacerbated this adversity 
through the deregulation provisions it introduced. This policy shift of the government, 
however, did not lead to the scrapings of previous labour migration policies that had praised 
OFWs (overseas Filipino workers) as New Heroes. This dual stance of the government 
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frustrated OFWs even more than before, their expectations of hero treatment remained high, 
but they saw the government dodge its responsibility to protect OFWs. Therefore, it was little 
wonder to see their eruption into the ardent OAV lobby campaigns in the early 2000s.   
Taken together, this study shows that the passage of the OAV law was the result of all 
these elements. As can be seen in this study, most of the external and internal elements were 
closely connected. For example, the development of communication technology enabled 
overseas Filipinos to organize themselves. However, no matter how many OFWs the Internet 
can link together, it would not be possible to mobilize them unless the common underlying 
grievances of overseas Filipinos were on their minds. In the same vein, although the Internet 
and the grievances resulted in unitary OAV lobby campaigns in the early 2000s, legislators 
would have been reluctant to pass the OAV law had it not been for presidential support.  
More important than selecting prominent variables is to indicate the fact that OAV 
advocates in the ICOFVR were well aware of the need to make use of opportunities given at 
the time. From their long experiences of lobbying efforts since the 1990s, OAV advocates 
knew that presidential support was vital. As highlighted in Chapter 4, it was for this reason 
that ICOFVR delegate members strived to make an appointment with President Arroyo ahead 
of their visit to the Philippines in 2001. As for the widespread use of the Internet and text 
messages, it could be suggested that these would not have been used to such a wide extent 
among the advocates if they had not been Filipinos. Overseas Filipinos were familiar with 
new technologies such as Short Messaging Service (SMS) and the Internet.
100
 These findings 
reveal that, no matter how appropriate political opportunities are, agents do not always adopt 
them. It rather depends on the capacity and situations of agents to keep opportunities at arm‘s 
length.     
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In Chapter 2, I laid out the plan that this study would help reconstruct Philippine 
politics literature and would support the alternative perspective, the contentious politics 
framework. To prove that the alternative approach is more suitable for explaining Philippine 
politics than other dominant approaches, it is necessary to assess how much society actors 
can keep politicians in check and ensure their claims in the policy-making process. To that 
end, Chapter 4 underscores that OAV advocates in the ICOFVR played a critical role in 
persuading legislators for the voting rights of overseas Filipinos. Although the advocates‘ 
role was one of many external and internal elements that influenced the passage, the chapter 
demonstrated their independent effect in alleviating the specific concerns and fears of 
lawmakers of the twelfth Congress. Therefore, this case study vindicates the argument that 
social forces from below, thanks to globalized environments such as technological 
development and international migration, effectively advance their influence against state 
actors in Philippine politics. As the preceding chapters suggested, these new type of civil 
society actors were not subject to patron-client relations since their economic status did not 
put them in desperate need of material rewards from politicians. Instead of asking legislators 
a favour as a client, OAV advocates stood up to the dominant political elite as a pressure 
group. They made a courageous attack on legislators by initiating ―Kicking out the scum in 
Congress (TALSIK)‖ campaign, the strategy of naming opposition legislators and remittance 
boycott moves. These successful lobby campaigns show that the changed nature of overseas 
Filipino activism supported its confrontation with the hitherto ironclad domination of the 
political elite. The widespread use of the Internet and mobile phones mobilised dispersed 
overseas Filipinos and encouraged them to participate in lobby campaigns for their voting 
rights. Given that the Philippines consists of 7000 islands, these new technologies will inspire 
90 
 
other Philippine civil society actors with an idea of organising their activities against the 
state. The existence of financial sponsors also emboldened OAV advocates to carry on their 
strategies. They even offered money and labour force to help the process of absentee voting 
and canvassing. Although this study shows that overseas Filipinos‘ money was offered to 
fight for their political right, it has been discussed and demonstrated that their financial help 
can help other civil society actors‘ activities in the Philippines (Opiniano 2004). Thus it will 
lay a foundation for stronger civil society activism in the future.  
Stronger civil society actors than before also contributed to the optimistic prospect of 
the Philippine democracy. In his book The Semisovereign People, Elmer Schattschneider 
(1960: 16) avers that ―politics is the socialization of conflict‖. It means that political elites in 
a country widen the scope of conflict, considered the most important strategy of politics, only 
when ―an attempt is made to involve the wider public‖ (Schattschneider 1960: 39). Thanks to 
emergence of overseas Filipinos as an influential political lobby group, Philippine democracy 
became to offer an arena where more wide-ranging political actors than before can compete 
with. Although the oligarchic elites in the Philippines still remains strong in their entrenched 
political positions, the fact that Philippine politicians chose to expand the scope of conflict by 
allowing overseas Filipinos in national elections is a hopeful sign for Philippine democracy. 
It is because, as Schattschneider (1960: 138) defines, democracy is ―a competitive political 
system in which competing leaders and organizations define the alternatives of public policy 
in such a way that the public can participate in the decision-making process‖.  
It is, however, important not to make any hasty conclusion that overseas Filipinos is 
certain to remain as a strong social force in the future. As can be seen from their lobbying 
efforts, overseas Filipinos have had difficulty conveying their voices into Congress due to the 
lack of representatives for overseas Filipinos‘ interests in Congress. In the immediate term 
the challenge for overseas Filipinos is winning more seats in Congress. Some hardship seems 
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certain as the results of absentee voting elections since 2004 undermined their avid 
campaigns. The registration and turnout rates of overseas Filipinos in the 2004 and 2007 
absentee voting elections were staggeringly low.
101
 Obviously, a variety of barriers were at 
work when overseas Filipino voters abandoned their hard-won voting rights. Carino(2007: 
127) notes that the low registration and turnout rate was ―reasonable and realistic‖ for many 
overseas Filipinos have acquired citizenship in their respective host countries and have 
unwillingness to sign an affidavit promising to resume physical residence in the Philippines 
within three years from the time of registration. Lack of voting venues also discouraged the 
overseas voters to cast their votes. Whereas geographically small host countries such as Hong 
Kong, Singapore and Brunei had higher registration data in the 2004 election, large countries 
where there were a large number of overseas Filipinos like the US, Canada and Australia had 
lower data(Carino 2007: 130). In addition, taking a day off and travelling a long distance to a 
polling station was not easy for some overseas Filipinos, many of whom – domestic maids 
and lots of physical labourers – were not even given the right to take a day off.  
Therefore the staggeringly low turnout of overseas voters in the Philippine elections 
cannot be used for a sweeping argument that overseas Filipinos are not interested in 
exercising their voting rights. As some overseas Filipino groups have endeavoured to shore 
up the turnout rate of overseas Filipino voters by scrapping some obstructive clauses in the 
OAV law (MB Jul 30, 2004, 16), the future of overseas Filipino activism in Philippine 
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Appendix 1. A template letter used in the OAV lobby campaign 
 
OPEN Letter to our Migrant Families on Urgent Appeal on Absentee Voting Bill 
Amsterdam, January 14, 2002 
  
Mga Magulang at Mga Kapatid! 
We urgently need your participation in our campaign to ensure the passage of the legislation 
of Overseas Voting during this Session of Congress which has convened on January 14
th
, 
2002. Our successful campaigning efforts have succeeded in putting the Absentee Voting Bill 
high on the legislative agenda of this 12
th
 Congress. 
The Bill being deliberated in the House of Representatives and in the Senate substantively 
reflects our position that all Overseas Filipinos be enabled to vote and that the appropriate 
mechanisms be put in place to facilitate the proper conduct and implementation of Absentee 
Voting. For our part, we have committed ourselves to co-operation with the COMELEC and 
the Philippine Embassies as well as to mobilisation of the Filipino migrant community 
organisations and other international organisations to ensure the integrity of the voting 
process. 
At this stage the Bill has run into difficulties and delays despite the fact that active support 
for the passage of the Bill has been publicly given by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, 
Speaker of the House, Honourable Jose de Venecia and Senate President, Honourable 
Franklin Drilon as well as by many individual Congress Representatives and Senators. 
In order to be implemented in time for the 2004 Election, it is essential that the Bill will be 
passed within the period of this session of the Congress – that is on or before May 2002 at 
the latest. Then the COMELEC can complete all the necessary preparations for our 
participation in Elections 2004.  
This is why we need your immediate action! We believe that if each of our migrant families 
writes an Urgent Appeal to the Congress and Senate that this will really make the crucial 
difference in achieving the immediate passage of the Bill. We are enclosing a "Model 
Appeal" so you can use it, as you think best. Please also ask your neighbours or your Parish 
Priest or Parish Minister to also write a similar letter. The Urgent Appeal should be sent 
separately to Senate President, Honourable Franklin Drilon; the Speaker of the House, 
Honourable Jose de Venecia and to the Congress Representative in your district by post or 
by fax.  
The main points to stress are: 
 Overseas Voting is a non partisan and non party political issue  
 Suffrage delayed is Suffrage Denied  
 Panahon Na! Pass the Absentee Voting Bill Now! Give us Overseas Voting in 2004! 
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On behalf of the Platform of Filipino Migrant Organisations in Europe 




For Urgent Attention of : Speaker of the House, Honourable Jose de Venecia  
Congress Representative ………………… 
Re: Immediate Passage of the Absentee Voting Bill  
Honorable Jose de Venecia 
Speaker of the House 
House of Representatives 
Batasang Pambansa 
Queson City, Philippines 
Tel/fax: 63 2 9325258/63 2 9316437 
  
Dear Honorable Members of the Philippine 12
th
 Congress 
We have been following the developments concerning the tabling and processing of the 
Overseas Voting Bill in Congress. We actively support the campaign of our children, 
relatives and Kababayans abroad in demanding the immediate passage of the Bill. It is a 
constitutional and fundamental right to be able to vote and participate in elections. Despite 
this, our Overseas families have been denied the right to exercise their vote for 14 years. Now 
is the time for you to act and pass the Bill by the end of this current Session of Congress, on 
or before May 2002. 
 Overseas Voting is a non partisan and non party political issue 
 Suffrage delayed is Suffrage Denied 











For Urgent Attention of: Senate President, Honourable Franklin Drilon 
Re: Immediate Passage of the Absentee Voting Bill  
Senate President, Honourable Franklin Drilon 
Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City  
Metro Manila, Philippines 
Tel/Fax: 63 2 5512993 
Dear Honourable Members of the Philippine 12
th
 Congress,  
We have been following the developments concerning the tabling and processing of the 
Overseas Voting Bill in Congress. We actively support the campaign of our children, 
relatives and Kababayans abroad in demanding the immediate passage of the Bill. It is a 
constitutional and fundamental right to be able to vote and participate in elections. Despite 
this, our Overseas families have been denied the right to exercise their vote for 14 years. Now 
is the time for you to act and pass the Bill by the end of this current Session of Congress, on 
or before May 2002. 
 Overseas Voting is a non partisan and non party political issue  
 Suffrage delayed is Suffrage Denied  
 Panahon Na! Pass the Overseas Voting Bill Now! Overseas Voting in 2004!  
Signature: _________________________ 


















Appendix 2. Sample interview questionnaires  
 
 
1.    What do you think was the main reason that the implementation of the OAV law was 
delayed more than 15 years?  
2.    When lobbying Congress, did you focus on the House of Representatives or the Senate? 
3.    Why was OAV advocates‘ lobby successful in 2003? Why not in 1995, 1998 or 2001? 
4.    What kind of lobby activities were made by OAV advocates? What was the most 
effective? 
5.    When was the first time that OAV advocates were invited in any committee hearings of 
Congress? 
6.    Were there any efforts to appeal to international organizations or the US? 
7.    Do you think generally OFWs helped a lot to raise fund for OAV lobbying? 
8.    Who were major financial donors for supporting the ICOFVR? 
9.    Can I access to documents describing financial situation of ICOFVR? 
10.    Can you describe ICOFVR‘s lobbying efforts using the Internet? 
11.    Would you say using the Internet improved OFW solidarity in the OAV lobby? 
12.    How did the ICOFVR appeal to OFWs?  
















Appendix 3. Philippine Daily Inquirer AD Contributors 
 

















Amount    
1.  Ceasar Torres (States) US$ 100 5,000 Upon bank confirmation, 
deposit was not Ceasar‘s 
contribution, as of Aug 5/02 
 
2.  Daphne Ceniza Kuok (Hong Kong) PhP  12,595  Received, 31 
May 
3.  Alfred J. Ganapin, eLagda-Riyadh SR 300 3,900 C/o bert barriga Received, 
June 3 
4.  Bert P. Barriga, Jr., eLagda-Riyadh SR 300 3,900 C/o bert barriga Received, 
June 3 
5.  Ronnie O. Abeto, eLagda-Riyadh SR 100 1,300 C/o bert barriga Received, 
June 3 
6.  Francisco Sigaya SR 100 1,300 C/o Bert Barriga Received, 
June 3 
7.  NaRS/Amie Silo (Saudi) SR 200 2,578 PON/11790793/114, Al-Rajhi 
Banking & Investment Corp 
KFSH&RC Branch (11400) 




8.  DCR (States) US$ 200 10,000 Ecashexpress, May 30 Received, 
June 10 
9.  Marvin Bionat (States) US$ 100 5,000 Ecashexpress, May 30 Received, 
June 10 
10. Romy Tangbawan (Saudi) SR 200 2,374.25  (Received 
June 5, 
P2,374.25) 
11. Armand Oliveros (States) US$ 100 5,000 Ecashexpress, May 30 Received, 
June 10 
12. Gil Ramos (States) US$ 100 5,000 Chinabank cheque, june 5 Received 
june 5 




14. Winda Redding (Canada) 
(aka Winda Lagumbay Petilla) 
US$ 100 5,035 Wire Remittance Order #: 
2150001 
Reference: 1002202150001, 
30 May/ chk ref # 
020603065171 BA, june 3 
Rec‘d june 
17, bel air 
Jupiter, 
makati 




16. Jun Aguilar/ FMW US$ 100 5,000 To contact Ms. Leony de 




17. Mae Ann Pineda PhP 500 500 Cash Rec‘d july 23 
18. Fe Abogadji (UK) PhP 2,000 2,000 Deposited from Makati thru 
Miguela Abogadji, 31 May) 
(Received 
May 31) 
19. Bishop Jose Palma, Calbayog Diocese, 
Samar (Platform supporter) 
US$ 100 5,000 C/o Platform Received 
July 12 
20. Miguel Bolos Php  64,547.6 
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 Rece‘d 04 
June 2002 
21. Romie Cahucom, OFW Investors Society SR 100 1,300 C/o bert barriga Received, 
June 3 
22. Gina and Ed Abitona - SR 200 2,663 C/o bert barriga Received, 
June 3 
23. Rodel Yap SR 100 1,300 C/o bert barriga Received, 
June 3 




















Amount    
1.  OFW Bank (Kuwait) US$ 100 5,000 ECashexpress, May 30 Received, 
June 10 
2.  eLagda, Inc. PhP  5,000   





4.  OFW Congress, c/o Alex Bello (Riyadh, 
Saudi) 
SR 1,130  C/o Bert Barriga Received, 
June 3 
5.  OFWNet Foundation US$ 200  Cash US$200 Rec‘d july 23 
6.  Kasapi Congress (Western Region, Saudi) SR 300 3,900   
7.  Kasapi-Greece (Platform Member) Euro 100 4,870 C/o ellene Received 30 
June 
8.  Philippine Solidarity Group Netherlands – 
FGN 
Euro 100 4,500 Personal delivery, June 2 Received, 
June 2 
9.  MOTHER, Riyadh, Saudi SR 100 1,300 C/o Alfred, personal delivery Received 
June 18 
10. HEALTH, Riyadh, Saudi SR 100 1,300 C/o Alfred, personal delivery Received 
June 18 
11. HOSTT, Riyadh, Saudi SR 100 1,300 C/o Alfred, personal delivery Received 
June 18 





13. Platform Friends in Manila PhP 10,000 10,000 C/o Platform Received 
July 12 
14. CFMW international office, Netherlands Euro 200 9,000 C/o Platform Received 
July 12 
15. PSAP (Platform member), The Netherlands Euro 100 4,500 C/o Platform Received 
July 12 
16. Bayanihan c/o Malu (Platform member), 
The Netherlands 
Euro 50 2,250 C/o Platform Received 
July 12 
17. FFON c/o Grace (Platform member), The 
Netherlands 
Euro 100 4,500 C/o Platform Received 
July 12 
18. Platform-Denmark c/o Pat Valenzuela US$ 50 2,500 C/o Platform Received 
July 12 
19. Creative Synergy Inc (CSI) (discount in 
PDI) + editing and lay out of Ad 
PhP 13,000 13,000 Discount from PDI June 4 
20. SEC-CRB - Saudi Electric Company - 
Central Region Branch (c/o Francisco 
Sigaya, Jr.?) 
SR 50  C/o Bert Barriga Received, 
June 3 
21. Mabuhay Toastmasters - Riyadh (c/o 
Francisco Sigaya, Jr.) 





1.  c/o Bert: P32,100.67 
2.  c/o Alfred: P8,000 
3.  c/o Marvin: P24,650 
4.  c/o Platform: P37,769.80 
 
TOTAL COLLECTION AS OF August 13, 2002 is P225,431.11 plus US$200 
 
Total Expenses =P149,840.00 
 
1.  PDI Ad payment =P142,000 (we paid the PDI only P129,095.28, c/o CSI. P13T 
discount was reflected as csi contribution in in the avb ad fund) 
2.  AVB Stickers for Sona, 3,000 pieces =P7,500.00 
3.  Risograph of ICOFVR Sona Statement =P340.00 
 
Balance: P75,591.11 plus US$200 (held in trust in Kakammpi) 
 
 
To all who have contributed their resources, time and talent, spent sleepless nights in 
order to put out the AVB ad, thank you so much. Seeing this project through is by itself an 
accomplishment. Congratulations to all of us! We made it! 
 
ellene 
Kakammpi 
 
 
